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TWENTY YEARS IN THE MAKING: 
TRANSITIONING PATENTED SEED 
TRAITS INTO THE GENERIC MARKET 
Since the introduction of genetically modified seeds into the global 
market during the 1990s, there has been little need to prepare for the 
expiration of the patents related to the technologies.  That is, until the 
expiration of the pioneer Roundup Ready seed-trait patent drew near.  
Now that Monsanto’s Roundup Ready seed-trait patent is nearing 
expiration, seed-producing competitors, farmers, and the global food 
market have raised questions regarding how Monsanto will handle the 
unprecedented transition into a generic seed market.  In response, 
Monsanto and other agricultural-biotechnology companies have created 
the Accord, comprised of two contractual agreements, which attempts to 
regulate the transition.  However, this private-sector solution fails to 
address the needs of all interested parties in the same way that the Hatch-
Waxman Act provides for the various parties in the pharmaceutical 
industry.  For this reason, the legislature should act to provide a regime 
for the transition that ensures that the genetic traits with expiring patents 
stay available for public use and that crops grown with these seeds may 
continue to be exported.  This Comment suggests a legislative solution 
that would meet these needs by delegating the regulation of the transition 
into the generic market to an administrative agency.  The solution 
proposed in this Comment would provide for a regime similar to one 
enacted through the Hatch-Waxman Act that allows for competitors to 
develop products using the patented genetic trait prior to patent expiration 
to prepare for the generic market.  At the same time, it provides a scheme 
to ensure the maintenance of the international regulation authorizations 
that are necessary for seeds and crops containing genetic modifications to 
be exported. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The veil that has been in place between consumers and the food they 
eat began to lift following the 2009 documentary, Food, Inc.1  The 
documentary exposed the expansive control small numbers of 
corporations have over the food people eat, including the control that 
Monsanto, a Missouri-based seed producer, has over the global grain 
market.2  After receiving a nomination for an Academy Award and 
being praised by Oprah, Food, Inc. played nationwide in theaters for 
twenty-four weeks and grossed more than four million dollars, 
indicating that the general public is fascinated by what has been hiding 
behind the veil.3  Food, Inc. is highly critical of Monsanto’s patent 
protection practices, painting Monsanto as a bully that uses intimidation 
and money to keep farmers in line.4  Now there is concern that these 
bully methods will continue and that they will be practiced over other 
seed producers to prevent competition in the upcoming market for 
generic seeds.5 
In September 2014, an unprecedented event will occur in the 
agricultural-biotechnology industry: the first of the widely economically 
successful patents for genetic traits in seeds will expire.6  This patent, for 
 
1. FOOD, INC., 3:19–5:10 (Magnolia Pictures 2009) (alleging that a “deliberate” veil has 
been placed by the food industry between consumers and the food they eat).  Food, Inc. has 
been described as “a powerful, startling indictment of industrial food production, revealing 
truths about what we eat, how it’s produced, who we have become as a nation and where we 
are going from here.”  Food, Inc., A Robert Kenner Film: Film Description, PBS, 
http://www.pbs.org/pov/foodinc/film_description.php (last visited Feb. 15, 2014). 
2. FOOD, INC., supra note 1, at 3:28–3:40, 1:07:20–1:08:11 (noting Monsanto as the grain-
industry leader). 
3. See Bryan Alexander, For “Food, Inc.” Oscar Nod Big, Oprah Bigger, NBC WASH. 
(May 30, 2012, 2:45 PM), http://www.nbcwashington.com/blogs/popcornbiz/For-Food-Inc-
Oscar-Nominations-Are-Big-Oprah-Bigger-83473987.html (noting that DVD sales for Food, 
Inc. have climbed since Oprah praised the documentary on her program); supra note 1 and 
accompanying text. 
4. FOOD, INC., supra note 1, at 1:07:20–1:10:09 (claiming that Monsanto uses a staff of 
seventy-five people devoted to the investigation and prosecution of possible patent 
infringements, including private investigators, and that farmers now feel like they cannot 
defend themselves against such claims because of the monetary cost of doing so). 
5. See infra Part III.A (discussing the recent antitrust litigation between Monsanto and 
DuPont, in which DuPont claimed that Monsanto forced independent seed companies to stop 
using the Roundup Ready trait associated with the expiring patent to prevent such companies 
from producing generic forms to be market ready once the patent expires). 
6. See U.S. Patent No. RE39,247E (filed Sept. 13, 1994) (issued May 27, 1997); Roger 
Parloff, Seeds of Discord, FORTUNE, May 24, 2010, at 94.  The 2014 expiration of Monsanto’s 
patent is only the first of many, “another wave of gene patents are scheduled to expire around 
2020, including those owned by [companies other than Monsanto.]”  Daniel Grushkin, Threat 
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the transformation of plant cells into seeds with the Roundup Ready 
trait, is owned by industry-titan Monsanto.7  The Roundup Ready trait 
enables plants to survive exposure to the active ingredients in 
herbicides—mainly, the Roundup Ready herbicide that Monsanto 
markets.8  The agricultural-biotechnology industry, uncertain itself over 
how to handle the transition into the generic market for seed traits with 
expired patents, has attempted to contractually bind members of the 
industry with the Accord, a voluntary contractual agreement—that is 
unsurprisingly industry friendly—between industry members to control 
the transition into the generic seed market.9  Absent governmental 
intervention, the future of the global food supply may be at risk due to 
the fact that regulation is necessary to ensure the maintenance of food 
exportation around the world and that restricting market access to seeds 
containing one of the most highly utilized genetic seed traits in the world 
will negatively impact the global crop yields.10 
 
to Global GM Soybean Access as Patent Nears Expiry, 31 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 10, 10 
(2013). 
7. ’247E Patent (patenting the transformation of plant cells into Roundup Ready seeds; 
this patent is owned by Monsanto).  The ’247E Patent claims the transformation of “plant 
cells with novel protein-encoding gene sequences that encode for [glyphosate-tolerant 5-
enolpyruvylshikimate-3-phosphate synthases], a glyphosate-tolerant enzyme.”  Monsanto Co. 
v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1343–44 (Fed. Cir. 2011); see also ’247E Patent.  A plant 
containing the glyphosate-tolerant enzyme “enables . . . plants to survive exposure to 
glyphosate, the active ingredient in many herbicides (including Monsanto’s own Roundup).”  
Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1764 (2013).  The ’247E Patent also claims the 
plants and plant seeds created through this transformation.  Monsanto Co., 657 F.3d at 1344; 
’247E Patent col. 164 l. 18–48.  This technology may be used in a variety of crops.  Monsanto 
Co., 657 F.3d at 1344. 
8. Parloff, supra note 6, at 98. 
9. See generally THE AGACCORD: DATA USE AND COMPENSATION AGREEMENT 
(2013) [hereinafter DUCA], available at http://www.agaccord.org/include/DataUseandCompe
nsationAgreement_10-9-13.pdf; THE ACCORD: GENERIC EVENT MARKETABILITY & 
ACCESS AGREEMENT (GEMAA) (2013) [hereinafter GEMAA], available at http://www.agac
cord.org/include/gemaa_firstamendedMay9.pdf; see also infra Part II.C (outlining the 
provisions of the Accord). 
10. See CLIVE JAMES, INT’L SERV. FOR THE ACQUISITION OF AGRI-BIOTECH 
APPLICATIONS, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: GLOBAL STATUS OF COMMERCIALIZED BIOTECH/
GM CROPS: 2012, at 6–8 (2012), available at http://www.isaaa.org/resources/publications/brief 
s/44/executivesummary/pdf/Brief%2044%20-%20Executive%20Summary%20-%20Engl 
ish.pdf; REECE WALTERS, ECO CRIME AND GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOOD 30–34 (2011).  
In 2005, five corporations, including Monsanto, controlled ninety percent of the 
global grain market.  Monsanto’s Big Deal, FOOD FIRST (Feb. 9, 2005), https://www.foodfirst.
org/fr/node/390.  In 2009, the top ten seed companies controlled seventy-three percent of the 
global seed market, with Monsanto itself accounting for twenty-seven percent of the market.  
ETC GROUP, WHO WILL CONTROL THE GREEN ECONOMY 22 (2011), available at 
http://www.etcgroup.org/sites/www.etcgroup.org/files/publication/pdf_file/ETC_wwctge_4web
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Instead of leaving the agricultural-biotechnology industry to regulate 
itself,11 the legislature should take an active role in protecting farmers 
and small independent seed companies using seeds with expired or 
expiring genetic patents by adopting a regime similar to the safe harbor 
provision of the pharmaceutical industry’s Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984 
and the Accord, and by delegating the regulation of the generic 
transition to an administrative agency.12  There is no basis in national or 
international law to provide for a transition from a patent-protected, 
privately created and owned, genetic-seed-trait monopoly into a generic 
marketplace.13  While the private sector has attempted to regulate itself 
with a voluntary contract, the Accord, its attempt fails to address the 
needs of all interested participants, such as farmers and small seed 
companies.14  In addition, the Hatch-Waxman Act’s scope has been 
limited in that the development of seeds with stacked genetic traits prior 
to patent expiration has not been protected from infringement claims.15  
 
_Dec2011.pdf.  As recent as 2013, it was reported that most of the American-grown soy 
contains the Roundup Ready gene and that nearly sixty percent of this home-grown soy is 
exported abroad.  Grushkin, supra note 6, at 10. 
11. About the AgAccord, THE AGACCORD, http://www.agaccord.org/?p=about (last 
visited May 8, 2014). 
12. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
417, § 202, 98 Stat. 1585, 1603 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006)) (Hatch-
Waxman Act); see also Amanda Welters, Note, Striking a Balance: Revising USDA 
Regulations to Promote Competition Without Stifling Innovation, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 
407 (2012) (outlining the appropriateness of relying on the Hatch-Waxman Act to regulate 
the transition of patented seed traits into the generic market).  While Welters provides a 
strong argument for relying on the Hatch-Waxman Act to regulate the patented seed trait 
transition because of the similarities in the pharmaceutical and seed industries, her Note was 
written prior to the full release of the Accord and thus lacks an analysis of the agreement.  
Welters, supra; see also supra note 9 and accompanying text.  Additionally, Welters fails to 
propose a way to move forward and apply the Hatch-Waxman Act and appears to disregard 
the issue of international registrations that ensure the continued international trade of 
products containing genetically altered organisms.  Welters, supra; see also infra Part IV; infra 
notes 127–33 and accompanying text. 
13. J. THOMAS CARRATO & BRANDON W. NEUSCHAFER, FROM PROPRIETARY TO 
GENERIC: A PRIVATE CONTRACTUAL MECHANISM FOR BIOTECH SEED PRODUCTS 4 
(2012), available at http://www.wlf.org/upload/legalstudies/legalbackgrounder/11-2-12Carrato 
_LegalBackgrounder.pdf. 
14. See GEMAA, supra note 9, at 1–3; Grushkin, supra note 6, at 10. 
15. Monsanto Co. v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., No. 4:09CV00686(ERW), 2012 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163982, at *10 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 16, 2012) (referring to a court order from 
June 29, 2012, the “Hatch-Waxman Order”).  Stacked seeds are seeds that have been inserted 
with more than one gene trait to allow farmers to purchase seeds that address multiple 
problems.  Sorting Out the Facts Behind Stacks, MONSANTO, http://www.monsanto.com/news
views/Pages/gene-stacks-facts.aspx (last visited Feb. 16, 2014).  Stacking is supposed to 
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As such, the legislature should adopt a regime based on the safe harbor 
provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act and the Accord.  Such a regime 
will allow for a smooth transition into the market for generic seeds by 
providing for the development of generic forms without the threat of 
infringement lawsuits, and will arrange the funding and mechanics 
necessary for maintaining international regulation authorizations. 
This Comment proposes a framework for a law that would provide 
for a competitive market for generic genetically modified organisms 
based off of the Hatch-Waxman Act and the Accord.  Part II begins 
with the history of patent protection for plants and seeds and then 
discusses the emergence of genetically modified seeds and the current 
concerns over Monsanto’s soon expiring patent for seeds containing its 
Roundup Ready trait.  Part II ends with a discussion of the agricultural-
biotechnology industry’s attempt to regulate itself with the drafting and 
signing of the Accord.  Part III discusses the recent litigation between 
Monsanto and DuPont that arose in part due to uncertainty in how to 
prepare for the generic market for genetically modified seeds.  In 
addition, Part III outlines the pharmaceutical industry’s Hatch-Waxman 
Act, specifically its safe harbor provision, which allows for the 
preparation of generic drugs prior to patent expiration.  Next, Part IV 
proposes the adoption of a law based off of the Accord, discussed in 
Part II, and the safe harbor provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act, 
outlined in Part III, that would balance the interests of both the patent 
holders and the small farmers.  Finally, Part V offers concluding 
remarks. 
II. BACKGROUND OF PLANT PATENTS, GENETICALLY MODIFIED 
ORGANISMS, AND THE ACCORD 
The patentability of plant seeds, especially those of sexually 
reproducing plants, has long been debated.16  At the heart of this issue is 
the common law exclusion to patentable subject matter for products of 
nature and the requirement of a full written description for a patent to 
 
incrementally improve the quality of the seeds.  Id.  Seed companies cross-license their 
patented traits with each other to improve the quality of seeds that they provide.  Id. (follow 
the “As you can see in this table” link) (indicating the various cross-licensed traits available in 
2009 among the industry’s largest companies). 
16. Noting the years of the decisions, see, e.g., J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred 
Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 124, 133 (2001); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 303, 310–11, 
313 (1980); Ex parte Hibberd, 227 USPQ 443, 443 (1985). 
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be issued.17  By enacting the Plant Patent Act, Congress expressed its 
intent to allow patents to be issued for plants.18  However, between the 
Plant Patent Act, the Plant Variety Protection Act, and the 
requirements for a utility patent under 35 U.S.C. § 101, confusion arose 
as to what protections were available to plants and how those 
protections fit together under the different laws.19  In 2001, the Supreme 
Court addressed the issue and held that plants and plant seeds may be 
protected through all three statutory provisions, using either a plant 
patent, a plant variety protection certificate, or a utility patent.20 
With the availability of patent protection for plant seeds, the market 
for genetically modified seeds grew.21  Monsanto became the industry 
leader, finding market success with its patented herbicide Roundup and 
the patented gene trait that allows plants to be tolerant of the 
herbicide.22  This gene trait, the first patented trait to receive widespread 
market success, was marketed as Roundup Ready; however, the patent 
for the Roundup Ready gene is set to expire in late 2014.23  There have 
been growing concerns over how Monsanto will handle the transition of 
one of its most economically successful patents into the public domain, 
especially given its litigious history.24  The expiration of the patent for 
 
17. Ex parte Hibberd, 227 USPQ at 445. 
18. Id. 
19. See, e.g., J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc., 534 U.S. at 127. 
20. See id. 
21. See Recent Trends in GE Adoption, USDA.GOV, http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-
products/adoption-of-genetically-engineered-crops-in-the-us/recent-trends-in-ge-adoption.as 
px (last updated Jul. 9, 2013); see also infra notes 74–75 and accompanying text. 
22. Parloff, supra note 6, at 96–97. 
23. See ’247E Patent (patenting the transformation of plant cells into Roundup Ready 
seeds; this patent is owned by Monsanto); Andrew Pollack, As Patent Ends, a Seed’s Use will 
Survive, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2009, at B3. 
24. Parloff, supra note 6, at 98, 106.  As of July 2009, Monsanto had filed lawsuits against 
farmers 138 times in the United States.  Pilot Grove Co-Op, MONSANTO, http://www.monsant 
o.com/newsviews/Pages/pilot-grove-coop.aspx (last visited Feb. 16, 2014); see also, e.g., 
Monsanto Co. v. Parr, 545 F. Supp. 2d 836, 836–37, 839 (N.D. Ind. 2008) (regarding a case 
where Monsanto sued Parr, a man who provided seed cleaning services to farmers to aid in 
seed replanting, for patent infringement and inducement to infringe a patent); Monsanto Co. 
v. Pilot Grove Coop. Elevator, Inc., No. 4:06CV1476(TIA), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85522, at 
*1 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 19, 2007) (regarding a case where Monsanto sued Pilot Grove for patent 
infringement, inducement to infringe a patent, and breach of contract).  However, the most 
famous suit brought by Monsanto occurred in Canada against farmer Percy Schmeiser, who 
still maintains that plants containing Monsanto’s patented traits were not planted by him but 
were instead blown onto his fields or carried by birds.  See Monsanto Can. Inc. v. Schmeiser, 
[2004] 1 S.C.R. 902, paras. 24, 27, 60, 86, 97 (Can.) (holding that Monsanto’s patent is valid 
and that Schmeiser, though he claimed to have not planted seeds containing Monsanto’s 
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the Roundup Ready gene is the first, but not the last, of the patents for 
seed traits to expire.25 
In late 2012, the Biotech Industry Organization (BIO) and the 
American Seed Trade Association (ASTA) released their solution to 
the transition.26  The two organizations, both “major trade groups for the 
seed and biotech industries,” created the Accord, a contractual 
agreement between companies that chose to sign on, which is comprised 
of two separate agreements: the Generic Event Marketability and 
Access Agreement (GEMAA)27 and the Data Use and Compensation 
Agreement (DUCA).28  The GEMAA was released and opened for 
signatures in October of 2012, and the DUCA was released and opened 
for signatures in December of 2013.29  While Monsanto has signed on to 
the GEMAA30 and is thus contractually obligated to its terms, the 
Accord is limited to governing those companies that chose to agree to its 
terms.31  As of May 2013, ten companies had signed on to the GEMAA; 
however, none of those ten companies are one of the roughly 600 small 
seed companies operating within the United States.32 
 
patented traits, was infringing upon Monsanto’s patent); Percy Schmeiser, MONSANTO, 
http://www.monsanto.com/newsviews/Pages/percy-schmeiser.aspx (last visited Feb. 16, 2014). 
25. See AM. SEED TRADE ASS’N & BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUS. ORG., FACTSHEET: THE 
AGACCORD® IS NOW COMPLETED AS THE DATA USE AND COMPENSATION IS OPEN FOR 
SIGNATURE 1 (2013) [hereinafter DUCA Factsheet], available at http://www.agaccord.org/incl
ude/DUCAFACTSHEET.pdf.; Grushkin, supra note 6, at 10. 
26. Press Release, Am. Seed Trade Ass’n & Biotechnology Indus. Org., The Accord: 
Generic Event Marketability and Access Agreement Is Now Effective (Nov. 15, 2012) 
[hereinafter GEMAA Is Now Effective], available at http://www.agaccord.org/include/press11
152012.pdf.  
27. Amanda Peterka, Biotech: Industry Inks Agreement to Address Expiring Seed 
Patents, GREENWIRE (Nov. 1, 2012, 1:05 PM), http://www.eenews.net/gw/2012/11/01. 
28. About the AgAccord, supra note 11. 
29. Press Release, Am. Seed Trade Ass’n & Biotechnology Indus. Org., The Accord: 
Generic Event Marketability and Access Agreement Is Open for Signature (Oct. 31, 2012) 
[hereinafter GEMAA Is Open for Signature], available at http://www.agaccord.org/include/pr
ess10312012.pdf; Press Release, Am. Seed Trade Ass’n & Biotechnology Indus. Org., The 
AgAccord®: Data Use and Compensation Agreement Is Open for Signature (Dec. 4, 2013) 
[hereinafter DUCA Is Open for Signature], available at http://www.agaccord.org/include/duca
_press_release.pdf.  Despite claims that the DUCA would be released in early 2013, it was not 
released until December 2013.  See GEMAA Is Open for Signature, supra; DUCA Is Open 
for Signature, supra. 
30. GEMAA Is Now Effective, supra note 26. 
31. About the AgAccord, supra note 11. 
32. See GEMAA, supra note 9, at 29 app. B; Grushkin, supra note 6, at 11. 
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A. The Path to the Patented Seed 
Under Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States 
Constitution, Congress has the power “[t]o promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”33  This clause allows Congress to issue patents, thus 
providing Congress the power to give the patent holder a monopoly for 
a limited time.34  The first statute expressly giving plants patent 
protection came in 1930 with the Plant Patent Act.35  This Act, 
recodified in 1952, allowed “plant patents” to be issued in addition to 
the already existing utility patents of 35 U.S.C. § 101 and design patents 
of 35 U.S.C. § 171.36  Currently, the Plant Patent Act allows for the 
issuance of a plant patent to “[w]hoever invents or discovers and 
asexually reproduces any distinct and new variety of plant, including 
cultivated sports, mutants, hybrids, and newly found seedlings, other 
than a tuber propagated plant or a plant found in an uncultivated 
state.”37  After gaining a plant patent, the holder is given the exclusive 
right to asexually reproduce the plant, sell the reproduced plant, and 
import the plant into the United States.38 
Forty years after Congress gave express patent protection to 
asexually reproducing plants with the Plant Patent Act,39 Congress 
passed the Plant Variety Protection Act in 1970.40  This Act provides 
“patent-like protection”41 for “[t]he breeder of any sexually reproduced 
or tuber propagated plant variety (other than fungi or bacteria) who has 
so reproduced the variety” if the variety is new, distinct, uniform, and 
 
33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
34. JANICE M. MUELLER, PATENT LAW 25–26 (4th ed. 2013). 
35. Act of May 23, 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-245, 46 Stat. 376 (codified as amended at 35 
U.S.C. §§ 161–164 (2006)). 
36. Act of July 19, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, § 161, 66 Stat. 792, 804 (codified as amended 
at 35 U.S.C. §§ 161–164 (2006)); J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 
U.S. 124, 124, 127, 133 & n.5, 145 (2001) (holding that newly developed plant breeds may be 
issued utility patents). 
37. 35 U.S.C. § 161. 
38. Id. § 163. 
39. The first protection for asexually reproducing plants came with the 1930’s Plant 
Patent Act.  46 Stat. at 376. 
40. Plant Variety Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 91-577, 84 Stat. 1542 (1970) (codified as 
amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321–2583 (2012)); see also infra notes 57–58 and accompanying text. 
41. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc., 534 U.S. at 138. 
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stable.42  Upon the issuance of a certificate, this protection includes the 
right to sell or market the plant, import and export the plant from the 
Unites States, and sexually reproduce the plant for purposes of 
marketing the plant.43  These protections are strikingly similar to those 
given to holders of plant patents under the Plant Patent Act.44  In 
addition to expressly providing these protections, Congress gave farmers 
the right “to save seed produced by the person from seed obtained, or 
descended from seed obtained, by authority of the owner of the variety 
for seeding purposes and use such saved seed in the production of a 
crop . . . or for sale.”45  In making this provision for seed saving to 
produce crops, Congress recognized farmers’ interests in using protected 
plants.46  Congress also limited the protections for plant varieties by 
expressly authorizing “[t]he use and reproduction of a protected variety 
for plant breeding or other bona fide research,” with no requirement of 
authorization by the variety owner.47  The term of the certificate is, in 
general, twenty years after the certificate is issued.48  One exception to 
this twenty-year term is when the plant is a tree or vine, in which case 
the protection is extended to twenty-five years.49 
The Supreme Court entered the debate in 1980, with Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty, which held that living things are patentable under 35 
U.S.C. § 101.50  In doing so, the Court found that “the relevant 
distinction” in determining whether something falls within the 
 
42. 7 U.S.C. § 2402(a). 
43. Id. § 2541(a). 
44. See id.; 35 U.S.C. § 163 (2006). 
45. 7 U.S.C. § 2543.  The right to save seed first recognized in the Plant Variety 
Protection Act is now a far cry from the restrictions imposed on farmers under seed company 
license agreements.  See infra notes 92–95 and accompanying text. 
46. See 7 U.S.C. § 2543.  Today, much of the criticism of Monsanto stems from its 
practice of suing farmers who save seeds for patent infringement.  See Why Does Monsanto 
Sue Farmers Who Save Seeds?, MONSANTO, http://www.monsanto.com/newsviews/Pages/why
-does-monsanto-sue-farmers-who-save-seeds.aspx (last visited Feb. 18, 2014) [hereinafter 
Why Does Monsanto Sue Farmers]; see also supra note 24. 
47. This provision is commonly referred to as the research exception.  7 U.S.C. § 2544; 
Sidney B. Williams, Jr., Protection of Plant Varieties and Parts as Intellectual Property, SCI., 
July 6, 1984, at 18, 19, 21. 
48. 7 U.S.C. § 2483(b)(1). 
49. Id. § 2483(b)(1)(B). 
50. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980) (holding that a bacterium is 
patentable). 
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patentable subject matter of 35 U.S.C. § 10151 is “not between living and 
inanimate things, but between products of nature, whether living or not, 
and human-made inventions.”52  In Chakrabarty, the Court said that a 
bacterium capable of breaking down components of crude oil was new, 
with “markedly different characteristics from any found in nature and 
one having the potential for significant utility,” and that the bacterium 
was a result of the patentee’s “handiwork.”53  As such, the bacterium fell 
within the patentable subject matter of 35 U.S.C. § 101.54  This decision 
opened the door for other man-made living organisms to be patented 
with the traditional utility patent. 
Using the opening the Supreme Court made in Chakrabarty, the 
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) Board of Patent Appeals and 
Interferences issued an agency decision, Ex parte Hibberd, in 1985,55 
which led to the practice of the PTO to issue utility patents for plants.56  
In Ex parte Hibberd, the PTO Board of Patent Appeals and 
Interferences addressed the patentability of maize plant seeds that 
develop into sexually reproducing plants under 35 U.S.C. § 101.57  
Finding that the Plant Patent Act and the Plant Variety Protection Act 
are not the “exclusive forms of protection for plant life,” the PTO Board 
of Patent Appeals said that plants can be patented under § 101.58  The 
PTO Board of Patent Appeals held that plants are included in the 
meaning of “manufacture” or “composition of matter” and therefore 
can be issued a utility patent, for plants thus fall within patentable 
subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.59  This viewpoint was supported by 
the Supreme Court sixteen years later in the 2001 case J.E.M. Ag 
Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc.60 
In J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc., the matter of what protection is offered to 
newly developed plant breeds came to a head when the Supreme Court 
 
51. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).  Under § 101, patentable subject matter includes processes, 
machines, manufactures, or compositions of matter, and “any new and useful improvement 
thereof.”  Id. 
52. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 313. 
53. Id. at 305, 310. 
54. Id. at 310. 
55. Ex parte Hibberd, 227 USPQ 443, 445–46 (1985) (holding that plants can be issued 
utility patents under 35 U.S.C. § 101). 
56. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 131 (2001). 
57. Ex parte Hibberd, 227 USPQ at 443–44. 
58. Id. at 444. 
59. Id.  
60. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc., 534 U.S. at 131. 
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directly addressed the issue.61  There, as in Ex parte Hibberd, the Court 
addressed the patentability of corn seeds that develop into sexually 
reproducing plants.62  The Court held that newly developed plant breeds 
may be issued utility patents under 35 U.S.C. § 101,63 despite the 
protections issued to plant varieties under the Plant Patent Act and the 
Plant Variety Protection Act.64  In reviewing the Plant Patent Act, the 
Court determined that the Act’s protection for asexually reproducing 
plants does not equate to “an affirmative decision by Congress to deny 
sexually reproduced plants patent protection under § 101.”65  
Furthermore, the Court found that the Plant Variety Protection Act is 
not the “exclusive means for protecting sexually reproducing plants.”66  
The Court left open the possibility that seeds may be protected by both 
the Plant Variety Protection Act and the Patent Act.67  In issuing a 
patent for a plant, either a plant patent or a utility patent, the term of 
the patent is twenty years after the patent application is filed.68  This 
twenty-year term is the same as the term generally provided by the Plant 
Variety Protection Act.69 
Congress came back into the picture with the Leahy-Smith America 
Invents Act of 2011, which fully went into effect in March of 2013, and 
leaves the Plant Patent Act and the subject matter for utility patents 
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 unchanged (as relevant to plants and seed traits).70  
As such, there is no foreseeable change to the patent protections offered 
to plants. 
 
61. Id. at 127 (holding that newly developed plant breeds may be issued utility patents). 
62. Id. at 124. 
63. Id. at 145. 
64. 7 U.S.C. § 2402 (2012); 35 U.S.C. §§ 161–164 (2006); J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc., 534 U.S. 
at 127. 
65. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc., 534 U.S. at 138. 
66. Id. at 140–41. 
67. Id. at 144. 
68. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2); MUELLER, supra note 34, at 20–21. 
69. 7 U.S.C. § 2483(b)(1); see also supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text. 
70. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified 
at 35 U.S.C. (Supp. V 2011)); MUELLER, supra note 34, at 20–21 & n.49.  The Leahy-Smith 
America Invents Act of 2011 did add two new subject matter restrictions for utility patents: 
human organisms and tax strategies are now statutorily barred from receiving patents.  § 14, 
125 Stat. at 327–28 (tax strategies); § 33, 125 Stat. at 340 (human organisms).  This change has 
no foreseeable implication on the patentability of seeds.  See generally 125 Stat. 284. 
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B. The Emergence of the Patented Seed and the Development of 
Uncertainties in the Market 
Companies such as Monsanto have been using gene-splicing 
technology to develop crops since the 1990s, but the manipulation of 
plant traits dates back to Gregor Mendel’s work with peas in 1866.71  The 
technology has been used to develop seeds for plants that are tolerant of 
herbicides72 as well as plants that grow faster and healthier.73  Companies 
may obtain plant patents, utility patents, or plant variety protection 
certificates for seed varieties that they develop using gene splicing.74  
These seeds are referred to as genetically modified organisms (GMOs), 
or GMO seeds.75  The value of producing seeds with genetically 
modified traits can be seen in the wide use of the technology today.  As 
of 2009, at least ninety percent of soybeans, sixty percent of corn, and 
sixty percent of cotton grown in the United States contained herbicide-
tolerant traits.76  Four years later, in 2013, ninety-three percent of the 
soybeans, eighty-five percent of corn, and eighty-two percent of cotton 
grown in the United States contained herbicide-tolerant traits.77  
 
71. WALTERS, supra note 10, at 8–11 (outlining both the technical and legal history of 
GMOs and giving credit to Gregor Mendel as the pioneer in genetic manipulation of plants); 
Pollack, supra note 23.  As early as 1996, about seven percent of the soybeans, two percent of 
the cotton, and three percent of the corn grown in the United States contained herbicide-
resistant traits.  Recent Trends in GE Adoption, supra note 21 (follow “Chart data” hyperlink 
under Adoption of Genetically Engineered Crops in the United States, 1996–2013 chart). 
72. Pollack, supra note 23. 
73. Traits, Technologies & Partnering, MONSANTO, http://www.monsanto.com/products 
/Pages/plant-traits-technologies.aspx (last visited May 14, 2014). 
74. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321–2583; 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 161–164 (2006); J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. 
v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 144 (2001); see also supra Part II.A (discussing the 
various protections that have become available for plants and seeds).  Monsanto’s soybean 
seeds that are tolerant of Monsanto’s Roundup herbicide entered the market in 1996.  
Georgina Gustin, Experts Question Monsanto Roundup Verdict; $1 Billion Patent Judgment 
Surprised Court Experts, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 10, 2012, at B1. 
75. Occupy Monsanto; Occupy Monsanto Stops GMO Seed Distribution, ENG’G BUS. J., 
Sept. 26, 2012, at 86.  A genetically modified organism, or a GMO, is defined as “[a]n 
organism produced through genetic modification.”  Glossary of Agricultural Biotechnology 
Terms, USDA.GOV, http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?navid=BIOTECH_GL
OSS&navtype=RT&parentnav=BIOTECH (last visited May 14, 2014).  Genetic Modification 
is “[t]he production of heritable improvements in plants or animals for specific uses, via either 
genetic engineering or other more traditional methods.”  Id. 
76. Pollack, supra note 23. 
77. Recent Trends in GE Adoption, supra note 21.  In addition to the high percentage of 
crops containing herbicide-tolerant traits, seventy-five percent of cotton and seventy-six 
percent of corn contain insect-resistant traits.  Id.  The trend of increasing percentages of 
crops being attributed to GMOs can be seen on a global level.  JAMES, supra note 10, at 1. 
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Monsanto stated that about 275,000 farmers a year purchase seed 
varieties for which it holds patents.78  Between Europe, Japan, and the 
United States, patents on plants and genes are increasing worldwide.79 
In 2012, Monsanto was the largest producer of GMO seeds.80  As the 
industry leader, Monsanto came under attack in an “Occupy” 
movement looking to force food producers to inform consumers 
through food labels when their food contains plants grown from GMO 
seeds.81  The “Occupy Monsanto” protestors claimed that such plants 
“contain novel untested compounds that result in more weed killer 
sprayed on our food.”82  Some even referred to the food as 
“Frankenfoods.”83  Protestors hoped that their efforts would result in the 
United States joining Europe, Japan, and China in requiring labels on 
GMO-seed food products.84  Such efforts have proven effective, as there 
have been movements in state legislatures throughout the country 
towards requiring GMO food product labeling.85  Criticism against 
 
78. Why Does Monsanto Sue Farmers, supra note 46. 
79. John E. Haapala, Jr., Patent Pools and Antitrust Concerns in Plant Biotechnology, 19 
J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 475, 476 (2004). 
80. Occupy Monsanto; Occupy Monsanto Stops GMO Seed Distribution, supra note 75.  
In 2009, an agricultural economist at Iowa State University claimed that Monsanto controls as 
much as ninety percent of the seed genetics business.  Christopher Leonard, Monsanto 
Squeezes Out Seed Business Competition, AP Investigation Finds, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 
13, 2009, 1:45 PM) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/12/13/monsanto-squeezes-out-
see_n_390354.html?view=print&comm_ref=false.  In addition to Monsanto, the other three 
chemical corporations that dominate the GMO food market are Sygenta, DuPont, and Bayer.  
WALTERS, supra note 10, at 12 (citing STEPHEN NOTTINGHAM, EAT YOUR GENES: HOW 
GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOOD IS ENTERING OUR DIET, at xi (2d ed. 2003)). 
81. Occupy Monsanto; Occupy Monsanto Stops GMO Seed Distribution, supra note 75.  
In addition to movements against Monsanto itself, there has been an increasing amount of 
public opposition to GMO foods in general, “manifested in consumer boycotts, farmer 
resistance, street protests and de facto moratoriums.”  WALTERS, supra note 10, at 58–62. 
82. Occupy Monsanto: Occupy Monsanto Stops GMO Seed Distribution, supra note 75.  
The effort to label foods containing GMOs for the public has been one of the main battles 
against Monsanto.  FOOD, INC., supra note 1, at 1:18:14–1:19:38 (discussing the importance of 
labeling food containing GMOs); GENETIC ROULETTE: THE GAMBLE OF OUR LIVES, 
1:11:30–1:17:33 (Institute for Responsible Technology 2012) (discussing the various efforts 
that have been made worldwide to label foods containing GMOs).  Critics have argued that 
Monsanto’s practice of genetically altering seeds equates to playing “roulette” with the 
“genetic integrity” of the world.  GENETIC ROULETTE: THE GAMBLE OF OUR LIVES, supra 
at 11:18–11:25. 
83. Parloff, supra note 6, at 96. 
84. Occupy Monsanto; Occupy Monsanto Stops GMO Seed Distribution, supra note 75. 
85. Benjamin Senauer, Mandatory Labeling of Genetically Engineered (GE) Foods: The 
Showdown Begins, CHOICES, 3d Quarter 2013, at 1.  See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21a-
92c (West 2013). 
SCHONENBERG- FINAL (7-8-14) (DO NOT DELETE) 7/8/2014  6:28 PM 
2014] TWENTY YEARS IN THE MAKING 1053 
Monsanto and GMO-seed food products came to the forefront of food 
health and environmental concerns in the 2009 documentary, Food, 
Inc.,86 and has been present ever since.87 
The debate over GMO seeds has not been limited to the United 
States.  Pope Francis has recently taken an interest in the ongoing 
debate over the safety and the prevalence of GMO-seed food products 
globally.88  The Pontifical Academy of Sciences came out in support of 
increasing global access to GMO-seed food products on the belief that 
there is “a moral imperative to make these technologies available to the 
poor.”89  Internationally, there is a wide disparity over the awareness of 
GMOs and disagreement over the safety of GMO-seed food products 
and the steps that should be taken to protect genetic diversity.90  Some 
 
86. FOOD, INC., supra note 1 (noting that major seed-producing companies have been 
lobbying against laws requiring food labels to indicate that the food contains GMOs).  In the 
documentary, Food, Inc., Monsanto is vilified for using allegedly intimidating techniques to 
investigate and enforce its patents and prevent farmers from seed saving, leading to a general 
feeling of acceptance by farmers that seed-saving practices are not allowed and that fighting a 
lawsuit against Monsanto would not be worth the money spent.  Id. 
87. See, e.g., Occupy Monsanto; Occupy Monsanto Stops GMO Seed Distribution, supra 
note 75; Dyan Machan, Planting the Seeds of Growth, BARRON’S, Aug. 12, 2013, at 40. 
88. Marcela Valente, Latin America: Pope Francis Raises Hopes for an Ecological 
Church, GLOBAL INFO. NETWORK, Mar. 22, 2013, available at ProQuest, Doc. No. 
1319251760.  For a brief overview of the interactions between the United States and the 
Vatican regarding GMO food products, see WALTERS, supra note 10, at 76–78. 
89. Ingo Potrykus, Lessons from the ‘Humanitarian Golden Rice’ Project: Regulation 
Prevents Development of Public Good Genetically Engineered Crop Products, 27 NEW 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 466, 472 (2010); Anna Meldolesi, Vatican Panel Backs GMOs, 29 NATURE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 11, 11 (2011); see also Albert Weale, Ethical Arguments Relevant to the Use 
of GM Crops, 27 NEW BIOTECHNOLOGY 582, 583–84 (2010) (“[T]here was a moral 
imperative for making such crops readily and economically available to those in developing 
countries who wanted them.”). 
90. WALTERS, supra note 10, at 54–58, 69–75 (noting that “the spread of anti-GM public 
sentiment extends beyond European boarders to include Australia, Asia and Africa”); Ryan 
Crawford, Note, Did I Save My Seed for This? United States Intellectual Property Law, the 
Continuing Shift in Protection from Growers to Developers, and Some Potential Implications 
for Agriculture, 14 SYRACUSE SCI. & TECH. L. REP. 35 (2006); Jeremy Grant & Raphael 
Minder, Transatlantic Split Persists Over GM Food, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2006, available at 
ProQuest, Doc. No. 228906957.  In 2005, less than 0.5% of American consumers saw GMO-
seed food products as a safety concern, but 54% of European Union consumers considered 
GMO food to be dangerous.  Id.  Peru became the first country in the Americas to ban GMO 
food in 2013 when it put a ten-year ban on GMO food.  Annie Murphy, Peru Says No to 
GMO, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (April 25, 2013), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americ
as/2013/0425/Peru-says-no-to-GMO (attributing “food safety, a lack of long term research, 
and the potential for contaminating and even wiping out non-GMO species,” and biosecurity, 
as justifications).  Turkey also recently placed a ban on GMO food when it banned twenty-six 
GMO products.  Turkey Bans 26 Genetically Modified Organisms, GREEN PROPHET (April 
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critics of the current U.S. agricultural policy argue that the policy is 
“directly at odds with the international goal of preserving genetic 
diversity.”91 
Despite the critics, GMO seeds have dominated the market since 
Monsanto introduced the Roundup Ready seed trait and set the 
industry standards in GMO seed use and licensing.  Monsanto licenses 
its seed traits to various seed producers and farmers under the 
Monsanto Technology/Stewardship Agreement (MTSA), claiming that 
this practice allows farmers to “realize the benefits from these 
inventions through the brands they prefer to plant on their farm.”92  
According to Monsanto, these licensing agreements allow seed 
companies to sell competitors’ seed traits, as well as giving some 
competitors (who own their own seed traits) the right to stack traits 
together.93  When purchasing seed varieties with patents belonging to 
Monsanto, farmers must enter into agreements stating “that they will 
not save and replant seeds produced from the seed they buy from 
[Monsanto].”94  This means that farmers must buy new seed each year, 
which can be a costly burden on small farmers.95  However, despite 
genetically engineered seeds costing more than conventional seeds by 
anywhere from thirty to eighty percent, farmers are typically willing to 
pay extra for the chance to make up for the difference in increased yield 
 
29, 2013), http://www.greenprophet.com/2013/04/turkey-bans-26-genetically-modified-organis 
ms/ (asserting food safety and genetic diversity as justifications for the ban).  On the other 
side though, is China, which recently stated that it would allow three GMO soybean varieties 
to be imported into the country.  Jin Zhu & Zhang Fan, China Gives Approval to 
GM Soybeans, CHINA DAILY USA, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2013-06/14/content 
_16618175.htm (last updated June 14, 2013, 1:40 AM).  As of 2012, China was one of the 
twenty-eight countries worldwide that produced GMO crops.  JAMES, supra note 9, at 3 tbl.1. 
91. Crawford, supra note 89. 
92. Licensing: The Facts on Monsanto’s Approach to Licensing, MONSANTO, 
http://www.monsanto.com/whoweare/Pages/seed-licensing.aspx (last visited May 14, 2014).  
The standard licensing agreement used by Monsanto is the Monsanto 
Technology/Stewardship Agreement (MTSA).  Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 
1344–45 (Fed. Cir. 2011); MONSANTO, 2014 MONSANTO TECHNOLOGY/STEWARDSHIP 
AGREEMENT 1 (2014) [hereinafter MTSA], available at http://www.siegers.com/pdfs/waivers/
MonsantoTSA.pdf. 
93. Licensing: The Facts on Monsanto’s Approach to Licensing, supra note 92. 
94. Why Does Monsanto Sue Farmers, supra note 46; see also MTSA, supra note 92, at 1.  
In the MTSA, farmers must agree “[n]ot to save or clean any crop produced from Seed for 
planting, not to supply Seed produced from Seed to anyone for planting, [and] not to plant 
Seed for production other than for Monsanto or a Monsanto licensed seed company under a 
seed production contract.”  MTSA, supra note 92, at 1. 
95. MTSA, supra note 92, at 1; see also Pollack, supra note 23. 
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or other reduced maintenance costs.96  Because the costs of Monsanto’s 
products are on the rise, there is concern that the control Monsanto has 
over the market will prevent farmers from being able to avoid the 
increasing costs.97  In the past, Monsanto has been strongly protective of 
its patents and violations of its licensing agreements, filing 145 lawsuits 
in the United States since 1997.98  
Dow Chemical, another industry leader, also requires farmers and 
seed producers to sign a licensing agreement.99  Under the Dow 
Agrosciences Technology Use Agreement, farmers may not “save or 
use any seed produced from Seed for planting by Grower or any other 
third party,” or “use or allow others to use Seed or any plant material 
produced from Seed for crop breeding, seed production, research 
(including, without limitation, agronomic testing or generation of 
comparative data against seed containing Third-Party Trait 
Technology), or generation of regulatory approval data.”100  This express 
bar on using licensed and patented traits for research or to gain 
regulatory approval is exactly what this Comment proposes to prevent 
near the end of the patent’s term. 
The Supreme Court recently held that a farmer operating under the 
MTSA cannot actively replicate, for his own use or for sale, the patented 
seeds covered by the agreement.101  In Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 
 
96. Parloff, supra note 6, at 100. 
97. Leonard, supra note 80. 
98. Why Does Monsanto Sue Farmers, supra note 46.  To protect themselves against the 
high costs of patent infringement lawsuits, farmers have been advised to purchase insurance 
to protect against GMO contamination.  Aviva Shen, Farmers Told to Buy Insurance if They 
Don’t Want to Get Sued by Corporations, THINKPROGRESS (Nov. 21, 2012, 9:00 AM), 
http://thinkprogress.org/health/2012/11/21/1224761/farmers-insurance-sued-by-corporations/.  
See generally USDA ADVISORY COMM. ON BIOTECHNOLOGY AND 21ST CENTURY AGRIC., 
ENHANCING COEXISTENCE: A REPORT OF THE AC21 TO THE SECRETARY OF 
AGRICULTURE (2012), available at http://www.usda.gov/documents/ac21_report-enhancing-
coexistence.pd f. 
99. DOW ARGOSCIENCES, DOW AGROSCIENCES TECHNOLOGY USE AGREEMENT 1 
(2012), available at http://msdssearch.dow.com/PublishedLiteratureDAS/dh_08bd/0901b80380
8bdce6.pdf?filepath=mycogen/pdfs/noreg/010-12440.pdf&fromPage=GetDoc.  Like the 
MTSA, the Dow AgroSciences Technology Use Agreement prohibits farmers from saving 
seeds.  Id. at 2. 
100. Id.  The “Third-Party Trait Technology” mentioned in the agreement refers to 
traits owned by Dow competitors, including the Roundup Ready trait owned by Monsanto.  
Id. at 1. 
101. Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1764–65, 1769 (2013).  “Bowman planted 
Monsanto’s patented soybeans solely to make and market replicas of them, thus depriving the 
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Bowman unsuccessfully argued that the exhaustion doctrine, which 
“limits a patentee’s right to control what others can do with an article 
embodying or containing an invention,” protected him from 
infringement liability.102  The Court noted a distinction between 
controlling the reproduction, or making, of Monsanto’s patented 
invention, and controlling the “particular item” sold to Bowman.103  The 
patent exhaustion doctrine limits only the patentee’s control over the 
particular item, not the patentee’s control over items that a purchaser 
subsequently makes.104  The Court thus upheld the MTSA’s limitation 
preventing farmers from saving and reproducing seeds where such 
practices are under the farmer’s control.105 
One of Monsanto’s most successful traits, known as Roundup 
Ready,106 which causes plant tolerance of the Roundup herbicide,107 is 
attached to U.S. Patent RE39,247E.108  This patent is set to expire in 
September of 2014; it is the first of such patents with widespread 
economic success to expire.109  The ’247E Patent will be the first of the 
patents that helped develop modern agriculture to reach expiration, and 
 
company of the reward patent law provides for the sale of each article.  Patent exhaustion 
provides no haven for that conduct.”  Id. at 1769. 
102. Id. at 1766. 
103. See id. at 1767. 
104. Id. at 1767–68 (“[T]he patentee retains an undiminished right to prohibit others 
from making the thing his patent protects.”). 
105. See id. at 1764, 1769.  The Court’s holding is limited to technology that reproduces 
under purchaser control, as opposed to an item that is entirely self-replicating.  Id. at 1769 
(“[I]t was Bowman, and not the bean, who controlled the reproduction . . . of Monsanto’s 
patented invention.”).  In Bowman, the Court noted that “Bowman was not a passive 
observer of his soybeans’ multiplication; or put another way, the seeds he purchased 
(miraculous though they might be in other respects) did not spontaneously create eight 
successive soybean crops.”  Id.  For more information on Bowman, see generally Patent Act 
of 1952—Patent Exhaustion Doctrine—Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 127 HARV. L. REV. 378 
(2013). 
106. Parloff, supra note 6, at 98.  Monsanto developed this trait by transplanting a 
bacterium gene into a soybean genome.  Id. at 100.  For more on the development of the 
herbicide-resistant gene traits, see Jerry M. Green, Evolution of Glyphosate-Resistant Crop 
Technology, 57 WEED SCI. 108, 108 (2009). 
107. See supra note 7.  Monsanto began marketing the Roundup herbicide, composed 
mainly of a salt known as glyphosate, in 1974.  Parloff, supra note 6, at 99.  The patent on 
Roundup weed killer has expired.  See U.S. Patent No. 3,799,758 (filed Aug. 9, 1971) (issued 
Mar. 26, 1974); Parloff, supra note 6, at 99. 
108. ’247E Patent; see also supra note 7. 
109. See ’247E Patent; Parloff, supra note 6, at 94, 97, 106. 
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several more are set to expire over the next fifteen years.110  Once the 
’247E Patent expires, the technology will enter the public domain, 
allowing for a generic market to develop.111  However, there is 
widespread concern that Monsanto’s fierce protection of its patents has 
caused a wall to develop in the process of creating and internationally 
registering generic versions of the trait.112  This block may result in 
Monsanto being able to extend its monopoly on the trait by years.113  
The ability to extend the term of a patent through the use of regulatory 
schemes that make it more difficult for competitors to enter the market 
quickly is reminiscent of the pharmaceutical industry’s delay in getting 
generic drugs into the market after patent expiration, a driving factor in 
the enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act.114  Because the Roundup 
Ready trait is protected by a patent, the research exception of the Plant 
Variety Protection Act does not apply.115  Thus, even taxpayer-funded 
researchers at universities are subject to Monsanto’s licensing 
agreements.116 
Monsanto has developed a second generation of its Roundup Ready 
trait, marketed as Roundup Ready 2 Yield.117  Monsanto-rival DuPont 
alleged that this second generation is not worthy of a new patent 
because the difference between the two products is merely a change in 
the genome location of the trait.118  Given the time required to develop 
and produce seeds, if Monsanto blocks the use of Roundup Ready 
before the ’247E Patent expires, it may effectively force companies to 
use Roundup Ready 2 Yield, which lies under Monsanto’s patent 
 
110. Grushkin, supra note 6, at 10 (“[A]nother wave of gene patents are scheduled to 
expire around 2020.”); Peterka, supra note 27.  
111. Parloff, supra note 6, at 100. 
112. Id. at 98, 104.   
113. Id. at 98.  
114. See KAYE SCHOLER LLP, PHARMACEUTICAL AND BIOTECH PATENT LAW 
§ 8:1.1[A] (David K. Barr & Daniel L. Reisner eds., 2013) (discussing the historical 
background of the Hatch-Waxman Act). 
115. 7 U.S.C. § 2544 (2012). 
116. Leonard, supra note 80. 
117. Parloff, supra note 6, at 102; see also Roundup Ready Soybean Patent Expiration, 
MONSANTO, http://www.monsanto.com/newsviews/pages/roundup-ready-patent-expiration.as 
px (last visited May 14, 2014). 
118. See Michael Stumo, Anticompetitive Tactics in Ag Biotech Could Stifle Entrance of 
Generic Traits, 15 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 137, 140–41 (2010) (discussing the differences between 
Roundup Ready and Roundup Ready 2 Yield and the economic implications of forcing an 
industry switch to Roundup Ready 2 Yield); see also Parloff, supra note 6, at 102. 
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protection and is more expensive than the original Roundup Ready.119  
In mid-2009, Hugh Grant, President and Chief Executive Officer of 
Monsanto, declared that: 
As we enter the next decade we’ll stand alone in the technology 
arena that we alone have created.  Our products will be 
fundamentally differentiated and thus we’ll compete against our 
own older technologies.  Our job then will be to replace every 
old biotech acre with a new one and gain lift the value 
proposition for growth.120 
After this statement was made, Monsanto denied any attempt to 
force a conversion to Roundup Ready 2 Yield.121  In December of 2009, 
Monsanto stated that “all existing Roundup Ready [] licenses would 
automatically be extended through the end of the product’s patent life 
in 2014” and “no farmer would be barred from saving Roundup Ready 
[] seed in the last year of the patent term.”122  This sentiment was also 
expressed by Hugh Grant in early 2010: 
[F]or Roundup Ready 1 soybeans, our original soybean product 
will remain available through and beyond Monsanto’s U.S. 
patent term, which expires in 2014.  Global regulatory support 
for this product will be maintained for at least three years 
beyond that point. . . .  [S]eed company licensees would be 
extended though the patent period to avoid any confusion 
regarding access to seed supply from multiple sources. 
 . . . . 
 
119. Stumo, supra note 118, at 140–43; see also Parloff, supra note 6, at 97. 
120. Hugh Grant, Chairman of the Board, President, & Chief Executive Officer, 
Monsanto Company, F3Q09 (Qtr End 5/31/09) Earnings Call (June 24, 2009) (transcript 
available at http://seekingalpha.com/article/152631-monsanto-company-f3q09-qtr-end-5-31-
09-earnings-call-transcript?part=single). 
121. Parloff, supra note 6, at 104.  Though Monsanto has claimed that it will not force a 
switch to Roundup Ready 2 Yield, DuPont claims that Monsanto is indeed forcing the 
transition to control the generic market for Roundup Ready before it has a chance to begin.  
Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Stay Discovery and 
for Separate Trial of Antitrust Counterclaims at 5, Monsanto Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours 
& Co., No. 4:09-CV-00686(ERW), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84512 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 16, 2009). 
122. Parloff, supra note 6, at 104.  While Monsanto has confirmed that a farmer may 
save certain seeds following the expiration of the Roundup Ready patent, it has made clear 
that the saving allowance only applies to farmers saving seeds “from their own farm back 
onto their own farm.”  Roundup Ready Soybean Patent Expiration, supra note 117.  “It would 
be illegal to provide saved seed to others for replanting or to obtain saved seed from others 
and plant it on your own farm.”  Id. 
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 . . . [I]t remains clear that seed companies may choose to sell 
either or both the original soybean products or the new 
generation, higher yielding soy technologies.123 
However, while Monsanto has pledged to extend license terms, it has 
not broadened the rights associated with them, such as allowing for 
increased stacking rights.124  In fact, Monsanto recently sued DuPont for 
stacking beyond its license.125  DuPont alleged that this conduct 
amounted to an antitrust violation.126 
The role that international registration and licensing plays in the 
timeline of both allowing farmers to save seeds after the ’247E Patent 
expiration and in providing market accessibility to those using the 
technology after the expiration is large.127  In order for farmers to sell 
their product internationally, they must comply with the registration and 
licensing requirements of other countries if they want to export to those 
markets.128  Currently, Monsanto itself maintains registrations and 
licenses for food products using its patented traits, not the farmers.129  
Monsanto has said that it will maintain the licenses through 2017, but 
after that time, farmers will not be able to sell crops with Roundup 
Ready in certain countries.130  However, Roundup Ready 2 Yield will 
have active international licenses after 2017,131 which will most likely 
serve as a strong inducement for farmers to purchase seeds containing 
traits under patent protection.  There is no current way to ensure the 
 
123. Hugh Grant, Chairman & Chief Executive Officer, Monsanto Company, F1Q10 
(Qtr End 11/30/09) Earnings Call (Jan. 6, 2010) [hereinafter Monsanto F1Q10 Earnings Call] 
(transcript available at http://seekingalpha.com/article/181283-monsanto-company-f1q10-qtr-
end-11-30-09-earnings-call-transcript). 
124. See Parloff, supra note 6, at 104, 106.  
125. Monsanto Co. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., No. 4:09CV00686(ERW), 2009 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84512, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 16, 2009); Parloff, supra note 6, at 98.  
Monsanto claims that its licensing agreement with DuPont and Pioneer allowed for stacking 
any trait except other genes developed to give plants tolerance to glyphosate herbicides, 
which is what DuPont was attempting to do with its OGAT trait.  Id. at 106. 
126. Monsanto Co., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84512, at *3; Parloff, supra note 6, at 98. 
127. GMO crops must be approved by a regulatory agency every three years in China, 
every five years in Korea, and every ten years in Japan and Europe.  Grushkin, supra note 6, 
at 10.  Once a patent expires, the financial incentive for maintaining international regulation 
authorizations is lost.  Id.  However, as of early 2013, about sixty percent of the American-
grown soy is exported and thus subject to such international regulations.  Id. 
128. Id.; Pollack, supra note 23. 
129. Pollack, supra note 23. 
130. See Parloff, supra note 6, at 104; Pollack, supra note 23; Monsanto F1Q10 Earnings 
Call, supra note 123. 
131. See Pollack, supra note 23. 
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maintenance of international licenses on a long term or permanent basis 
for seeds with traits no longer protected by expired patents.132  The 
Accord addresses the issue of maintaining international regulation 
authorizations; however, the Accord is merely a contractual agreement 
that applies to signatories that chose to abide by its terms.133 
Currently, the ’247E Patent is used in sixteen of the twenty-six seed 
products marketed under patents by Monsanto.134  The products include 
corn, soybeans, alfalfa, canola, sugar beets, and cotton.135  Because the 
products also utilize other patents that are not expiring soon, Monsanto 
could continue enforcing patent protection on the seeds by pursuing 
patent infringement claims against farmers for those patented traits.136  
Monsanto has stated that it will not enforce these patents and that the 
farmers can save the seeds after the ’247E Patent expires.137  However, 
Monsanto is under no statutory obligation to do this, and its history of 
going after farmers for patent infringement may have farmers nervous.138  
The looming threat of an infringement lawsuit may be inducement 
enough to have farmers feel the need to switch over to seeds with 
Roundup Ready 2 Yield.  Once the ’247E Patent expires, other 
significant changes will occur with seed-producing companies that use 
various traits, or stack traits, to develop seeds. 
 
132. See Grushkin, supra note 6, at 10.  
133. See About the Accord, supra note 10; Peterka, supra note 27; see also infra Part II.C 
(discussing the various methods for the maintenance of covered authorizations, or 
international regulation authorizations, that the Accord provides for). 
134. Product Patents, MONSANTO, http://www.monsanto.com/products/Pages/product-
patents.aspx (last visited Oct. 30, 2012).  These products include Roundup Ready® Corn 2, 
YieldGard® Corn Borer with Roundup Ready® Corn 2, YieldGard Rootworm with 
Roundup Ready® Corn 2, YieldGard® Plus with Roundup Ready® Corn 2, Genuity® VT 
Double PRO®, YieldGard VT Rootworm/RR2®, YeildGard VT Triple®, Genuity® VT 
Triple PRO® and Performance Series Sweet Corn, Genuity® SmartStax®, Roundup 
Ready® Soybeans, Genuity® Roundup Ready 2 Yield® Soybeans, Roundup Ready® 
Alfalfa, Genuity® Roundup Ready® Canola, Genuity® Roundup Ready® Sugarbeets, 
Genuity® Bollgard II® with Roundup Ready® Cotton, and Genuity® Bollgared II® with 
Roundup Ready® Flex Cotton.  Id. 
135. Id. 
136. Id.  For example, the Roundup Ready® Alfalfa is protected by several patents, 
including the ’247E Patent and U.S. Patent No. 8,124,848 (filed Jan. 31, 2003) (issued Feb. 28, 
2012), which will not expire until 2023.  Product Patents, supra note 134. 
137. Pollack, supra note 23.  Monsanto has stated that it believes the patent expiration 
process will include farmers and licensees being free to plant and re-plant seeds, as well as 
allowing companies such as DuPont to stack the traits.  Jack Kaskey, Monsanto Won’t Block 
Generic Seeds as Patent Ends (Update3), BLOOMBERG (Jan. 11, 2010, 4:40 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aFY8Uj4GAKOE. 
138. See supra note 24. 
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After the ’247E Patent expires, Monsanto will no longer be able to 
claim patent infringement for other’s stacking practices utilizing 
Roundup Ready.139  Seed-producing companies will be able to use the 
Roundup Ready trait without fees or licensing with Monsanto.  This will 
allow competitors, such as DuPont, to combine their own herbicide-
tolerant traits with the Roundup Ready trait to create seeds that are 
tolerant of new herbicides that have been developed to combat new 
weeds resulting from weed adaptations to resist herbicides now in use.140  
The Accord’s DUCA addresses the issue of stacking traits, but this 
contractual agreement is not law.141  Even under the DUCA, there is no 
right to use a patented trait for stacking purposes while the patent is still 
valid.142 
C. The Accord 
The Accord, “a private-sector driven mechanism that provides for 
the transition of regulatory and stewardship responsibilities for 
biotechnology events[] after patent expiration,” is the result of years of 
work by BIO and the ASTA.143  The Accord is comprised of two 
agreements: the Generic Event Marketability and Access Agreement 
(GEMAA) and the Data Use and Compensation Agreement 
(DUCA).144  One of the main driving forces behind the development of 
the Accord was the concern over the maintenance of international 
licenses and authorizations for traits after patent expiration.145  The first 
agreement to be released for signatures was the GEMAA, which was 
released in October of 2012.146  The GEMAA provides for the 
 
139. See infra Part III.A (discussing the recent litigation between Monsanto and 
DuPont). 
140. Glyphosate-herbicide immune weeds have evolved around the world.  WALTERS, 
supra note 10, at 37–38; Margaret Sova McCabe, Superweeds and Suspect Seeds: Does the 
Genetically-Engineered Crop Deregulation Process Put American Agriculture at Risk?, 1 U. 
BALT. J. LAND & DEV. 109, 111–12 (2012) (discussing how such weeds, described as 
“superweeds,” have evolved). 
141. DUCA, supra note 9, at 66; Peterka, supra note 27; About the AgAccord, supra 
note 11. 
142. See DUCA, supra note 9, at 66. 
143. AM. SEED TRADE ASS’N & BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUS. ORG., THE ACCORD: 
GENERIC EVENT MARKETABILITY AND ACCESS AGREEMENT IS OPEN FOR SIGNATURE 1 
(2012), available at http://www.agaccord.org/include/facts.pdf. 
144. Id. at 1–2. 
145. Id. 
146. GEMAA Is Open for Signature, supra note 29. 
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procedures to manage patent expiration.147  The second agreement, the 
DUCA, was released for signatures in December of 2013.148  The DUCA 
provides for access to data needed to maintain international regulation 
authorizations.149 
1. The GEMAA 
The GEMAA became effective in 2012 upon the signatures of five 
biotech companies, including Monsanto, DuPont Pioneer, and Dow 
Agro Sciences.150  Under the GEMAA, a patent holder must notify the 
Administrator of Patent Expiration (who is appointed by and reports to 
the GEMAA Committee of Signatories) of any expiration three years 
prior to the expiration—a fact anyone could easily learn of through 
publicly available information.151  At the time of the notification, the 
patent holder must choose one of three options in regards to “covered 
authorizations,” which include international licenses.152  The three 
options include independently maintaining and obtaining covered 
authorizations for its patented trait; seeking to share the responsibility 
of maintaining and obtaining covered authorizations for its patented 
trait; and giving notice of discontinuation of regulatory responsibilities 
for its patented trait.153 
Under the GEMAA, if the patent holder decides to maintain and 
 
147. Id. 
148. DUCA Factsheet, supra note 25, at 1. 
149. GEMAA Is Open for Signature, supra note 29.  See generally DUCA, supra note 9 
(maintaining international authorizations). 
150. GEMAA Is Now Effective, supra note 26.  The GEMAA became effective on 
November 15, 2012, a month and a half after its release, with the signatures of BASF Plant 
Science, Bayer Crop Science, Dow Agro Sciences, DuPont Pioneer, and Monsanto.  Id.  The 
agreement only needed four signatories to become effective.  GEMAA, supra note 9, at 1. 
151. GEMAA, supra note 9, at 2, 18.  Because patents are publically disclosed, the 
notification of an expiring patent is merely a convenience.  See Shubha Ghosh, Patents and the 
Regulatory State: Rethinking the Patent Bargain Metaphor After Eldred, 19 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 1315, 1316–17 (2004) (describing the patent bargain, the idea that public disclosure of an 
invention is “the price paid for” a temporary monopoly on the invention). 
152. See GEMAA, supra note 9, at 1, 4.  Under the GEMAA, a “Covered 
Authorization” includes “[a]ll Authorizations necessary for the cultivation and sale of a single 
Covered or Generic Event in the United States, and all Authorizations necessary to permit 
undisrupted trade of material containing a Covered or Generic Event (Seed Products or 
grain, or any product thereof regulated as a result of the Event).”  Id. at 1.  An “Event” is “[a] 
genetic construct inserted into a specific site in a plant’s genome.”  Id. at 2.  The DUCA 
defines an “Event” as “[a] single insertion of a nucleic acid construct into a specific site in a 
plant’s chromosome.”  DUCA, supra note 9, at 8. 
153. GEMAA, supra note 9, at 4. 
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obtain covered authorizations independently, it agrees to bear the 
burden of all costs associated with covered authorizations, independent 
of those producing the trait generically, for seven years, beginning at the 
date of notification.154  This means that the covered authorizations will 
be paid through a minimum of four years following the expiration of the 
patent.155  Under this option, the patent holder does not need to provide 
market access to the trait until the patent expires and never needs to 
provide access for those stacking the trait.156 
If the patent holder instead decides to try to share the responsibility 
of maintaining and obtaining covered authorizations for its patented 
trait, the patent holder and interested GEMAA signatories have sixteen 
months to negotiate a “joint responsibility agreement.”157  The joint 
responsibility agreement is required to include a provision that all 
parties executing the agreement shall have market access for all 
purposes to the patented trait, including stacking.158  If a joint 
responsibility agreement is made, the costs of maintaining and obtaining 
covered authorizations are shared among the parties to the agreement.159  
It was expected that most genetic traits with expired patents would end 
up with this shared-cost method; however, in practice, the option to 
independently maintain covered authorizations has more often been 
selected.160 
 
154. CARRATO & NEUSCHAFER, supra note 13, at 3; GEMAA, supra note 9, at 2, 4. 
155. See CARRATO & NEUSCHAFER, supra note 13, at 3. 
156. Id.  
157. Id.; GEMAA, supra note 9, at 4–5. 
158. CARRATO & NEUSCHAFER, supra note 13, at 3; GEMAA, supra note 9, at 5. 
159. CARRATO & NEUSCHAFER, supra note 13, at 3; see also GEMAA, supra note 9, at 
4–5. 
160. Grushkin, supra note 6, at 11.  As of May 2014, the only two notices that had been 
filed as a result of the GEMAA, both by Monsanto, called for independent maintenance of 
the covered authorizations, not the shared responsibility option.  GEMAA Notices, THE 
AGACCORD, http://www.agaccord.org/?p=GEMAA (last visited May 15, 2014) (providing 
the full list of Notices of Patent Expiration that have been received); J. THOMAS CARRATO, 
MONSANTO CO., THE ACCORD: GENERIC EVENT MARKETABILITY & ACCESS AGREEMENT 
(GEMAA) NOTICE OF PATENT EXPIRATION FOR 40-3-2 SOYBEAN (2013), available at 
http://www.agaccord.org/include/NoticeofPatentExpiration40-3-2Soybean.pdf (selecting to 
independently maintain covered authorizations, Monsanto filed a Notice of Patent Expiration 
for a soybean trait); J. THOMAS CARRATO, MONSANTO CO., THE ACCORD: GENERIC 
EVENT MARKETABILITY & ACCESS AGREEMENT (GEMAA) NOTICE OF PATENT 
EXPIRATION FOR MON 810 CORN (2013), available at http://www.agaccord.org/include/Notic
eofPatentExpirationMon810.pdf (selecting again to independently maintain covered 
authorizations, Monsanto followed the conditions of the Accord in filing a Notice of Patent 
Expiration for a corn trait). 
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Finally, if the patent holder decides to give notice of discontinuation 
of regulatory responsibilities for its patented trait, interested GEMAA 
signatories have sixteen months to negotiate a “transition agreement,” 
under which interested signatories would take over the responsibility for 
maintaining and obtaining covered authorizations.161  Like the joint 
responsibility agreement, the transition agreement is required to include 
a provision that the interested signatories executing the agreement shall 
have market access for all purposes to the patented trait, including 
stacking.162  If no transition agreement is made, the patent holder and all 
others must stop selling the trait, including seeds containing the trait, 
four years prior to the date that the patent holder stops maintaining 
covered authorizations.163 
To be a signatory of the GEMAA, one must “support[] access to, 
and availability of, Seed Products containing [patentable gene traits], 
including the growing, developing, marketing, selling, stewarding, 
processing, transporting, shipping, handling, or maintaining of such Seed 
Products.”164  As such, farmers are able to be signatories of the 
GEMAA.  However, unless the farmer qualifies as a non-profit 
organization under the Internal Revenue Code or a small business entity 
under the Code of Federal Regulations, the farmer would be 
responsible for a percentage of the GEMAA operating costs equal to 
that of all other signatories.165  Therefore, the cost of becoming a 
signatory may be a barrier for farmer participation.  If a farmer cannot 
become a signatory, he loses the ability to enter into the negotiations for 
either a transition agreement or a joint responsibility agreement; thus, 
he is subject to the decisions of the corporations that are already 
signatories.166  As of January of 2013, the GEMAA signatories only 
included “seed giants”—no small seed companies.167 
 
161. CARRATO & NEUSCHAFER, supra note 13, at 3; GEMAA, supra note 9, at 5–6. 
162. CARRATO & NEUSCHAFER, supra note 13, at 3; GEMAA, supra note 9, at 6. 
163. GEMAA, supra note 9, at 6. 
164. Id. at 3. 
165. Id. at 22 (citing I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006); 13 C.F.R. §§ 121.101–.108, 121.201 
(2013)). 
166. To participate in negotiations for either the transition agreement or the joint 
responsibility agreement, a party must be a GEMAA signatory.  GEMAA, supra note 9, at 5–
6. 
167. Grushkin, supra note 6, at 11.  As of May 2013, there were ten signatories to the 
GEMAA: American Farm Bureau Federation; American Seed Trade Association (ASTA); 
American Soybean Association; BASF Plant Science LP; Bayer CropScience; Dow Agro 
Sciences LLC; DuPont Pioneer; Gro Alliance, LLC; Monsanto Company; and National Corn 
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2. The DUCA 
Despite suggestions that the DUCA would be released in early 2013, 
the DUCA was not released for signatures until December of 2013.168  
At patent expiration, the DUCA requires its signatories to share their 
data regarding crops using single gene traits and multiple gene traits, or 
stacked seeds, in return for the management of the data.169  The crop 
data is required to be submitted periodically to maintain international 
regulation authorizations.170  This unified data management system 
would be particularly beneficial to signatories because many of the 
stacked seeds contain genetic traits from multiple companies.171  Such a 
system should “facilitate and expedite the development of 
new . . . ‘stacked’ seed products.”172  While the development of new 
stacked seeds would benefit farmers by combining companies’ patented 
traits, the new seeds are more likely to contain newer traits, such as 
Roundup Ready 2 Yield, instead of traits with soon to be expired 
traits.173 
The ability to sell GMO crops is heavily regulated throughout the 
world through international regulation authorizations.174  In the United 
States, once the Department of Agriculture (USDA) “deregulates” the 
gene trait, the use of the trait in crops is indefinitely accepted.175  
However, other countries only approve the use of the gene in specific 
crops (and thus the importation of these specific crops) for specified 
time periods, requiring companies to reapply for subsequent time 
periods.176  Countries worldwide vary in the duration of approvals.177  In 
addition to the maintenance of international authorizations already in 
 
Growners Association.  GEMAA, supra note 9, at 29 app. B.  There are roughly six hundred 
small seed companies in the United States that have yet to sign the GEMAA.  Grushkin, 
supra note 6, at 11. 
168. DUCA Factsheet, supra note 25, at 1; Grushkin, supra note 6, at 11. 
169. Grushkin, supra note 6, at 11. 
170. Id. 
171. Id.  Monsanto’s Smartstax corn crop contains traits from Bayer Crop Science, Dow 
Agro Sciences, and Monsanto itself, developed through cross-licensing between the 
companies.  Id. 
172. CARRATO & NEUSCHAFER, supra note 13, at 3. 
173. Sorting Out the Facts Behind Stacks, supra note 15, at 3.  
174. See Grushkin, supra note 6, at 10. 
175. Id. 
176. See id. 
177. Id.  China allows for three years of approval per application; Korea allows for five 
years; and Japan and Europe extend the application period to ten years.  Id. 
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place, new authorizations may need to be obtained both in countries 
with newly implemented authorization procedures and for new products 
utilizing the generic traits.178  To obtain an international regulation 
authorization, one must undergo research and field testing and compile 
what is known as proprietary regulatory property (PRP), consisting of 
“studies, dossiers, data, and submissions.”179  PRP is owned by the seed 
companies and “is separately protected apart and distinct 
from . . . patent law.”180 
Without the maintenance of the international regulation 
authorizations, “[t]here could be a terrible trade disruption if [there 
were] a product that was no longer registered in a foreign country.  It 
could lock down ships.  It could disrupt the entire trade system.”181  The 
DUCA recognizes the risk that failure to maintain international 
regulation authorizations poses: “Without obtaining and maintaining 
these authorizations, the commercial marketability of Seed Products 
containing Generic [traits] will be jeopardized.”182  Because of the 
importance in maintaining international regulation authorization and 
the seed companies’ interest in protecting their PRP, even after patents 
expire, there is a need for regulating access to PRP in a way that allows 
for authorizations involving seeds and crops containing generic traits.  
The DUCA provides an example of one way to fulfill this need. 
 
178. DUCA, supra note 9, at 1–2 (noting that “even though all patents on [a trait] have 
expired, there still will be Continuing Maintenance Costs” associated with the “complex and 
costly” international authorizations).  For more information on the various costs associated 
with obtaining and maintaining international regulatory authorizations, see DUCA, supra 
note 9, at app. H. 
179. Id. at 1–2.  The DUCA provides a specific definition for PRP: 
The data, studies, dossiers, submissions and Authorizations that enable the 
cultivation and sale of a Covered Event as a single Event in the United States and 
allow export and ex-United States use of material containing that Covered Event (id 
est Seed Products or grain) or any product regulated as a result of the Event.  
Proprietary Regulatory Property includes Regulatory Data, Regulatory Methods 
and Regulatory Correspondence. 
Id. at 10.  Whether a gene trait constitutes a “covered event” is determined under article V of 
the DUCA, but it generally includes commercialized gene traits for which the patent is within 
four years of expiration.  See id. at 18–19.  For purpose of this Comment, covered events will 
simply be referred to in general terms of gene traits. 
180. DUCA Factsheet, supra note 25, at 3.  PRP may be protected as intellectual 
property itself under law such as copyright, trade secret, or patent law.  See DUCA, supra 
note 9, at 8. 
181. Grushkin, supra note 6, at 10 (quoting Ray Gaesser, farmer and American Soybean 
Association Vice President). 
182. DUCA, supra note 9, at 2. 
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Before the patent for a gene trait expires, the DUCA requires that 
the PRP owner (most likely also the patent holder) negotiate in good 
faith with any other DUCA signatory that requests access to the PRP 
and the gene trait in writing.183  While the PRP owner is required to 
enter into negotiations, the DUCA does not impose any requirement or 
obligation to provide access to the PRP or trait before the patent’s 
expiration or for either party to accept any offer.184  Because of the 
inherent power disparity between the PRP owner and the party seeking 
access to the PRP, it is likely that the negotiations will be dominated by 
the PRP owner.  Without implementing a system of guaranteed PRP 
sharing and protection from patent infringement claims during a 
specified pre-patent-expiration period, the DUCA fails to guarantee any 
method for creating a generic market for seeds containing gene traits 
just after patent expiration. 
What the DUCA does provide is a system for organizing signatories 
who wish to continue to use gene traits after patent expiration and for 
maintaining international regulation authorizations as long as the 
signatories require.  Outlined in the DUCA’s Process Schedule, the 
DUCA procedure begins in the same way that the GEMAA’s does, 
with an initial notice made to all DUCA signatories three years before a 
patent’s expiration.185  After receiving the initial notice from a PRP 
owner, a signatory has one month to execute a confidentiality 
agreement and send it to a signatory-appointed administrator, indicating 
an interest in maintaining the international authorizations for the trait.186  
Within three-and-a-half months of the initial notice, the administrator 
convenes a meeting of the signatories that executed confidentiality 
agreements to discuss the signatories’ interest in becoming “verified.”187  
To further participate in the DUCA procedure for a gene trait, the 
signatory must be verified.188  In addition, the signatory must create a 
“Verification Fund,” the size of which depends on the estimated costs of 
 
183. Id. at 19. 
184. Id. 
185. Id. at 8, 23–24, app. G; see also GEMAA, supra note 9, at 2.  The confidentiality 
agreement is attached to the DUCA in an appendix.  DUCA, supra note 9, at app. D.  After a 
signatory executes a confidentiality agreement, it will receive a “Confidential Notice.”  Id. at 
24–25, app. G. 
186. DUCA, supra note 9, at 24, app. G; see also id. at 5 (defining an administrator). 
187. Id. at 25, app. G. 
188. Id. at 25–27.  
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continued maintenance of international regulation authorizations.189  
The size of the fund does not take the signatory’s identity or ability to 
pay into account, indicating that small companies or sole proprietorships 
may be prevented from participating in the process.190 
After the verified signatories and the PRP owner are identified and 
all necessary funds are established, the parties enter into negotiations to 
develop terms and conditions for a “comprehensive agreement.”191  If 
the comprehensive agreement is not resolved within two years of the 
initial notice being sent out (i.e., one year prior to patent expiration), 
then the parties must enter into binding arbitration for the creation of 
the comprehensive agreement.192  Generally, the comprehensive 
agreement will provide for an assessment of a portion of the costs for 
maintaining international regulation authorizations, appoint a party to 
be the “operator” that is responsible for maintaining authorizations, and 
provide access to the PRP for the verified signatories.193  This limitation 
on access to the PRP information and control over the procedure should 
not limit non-parties to the comprehensive agreement from benefiting 
from the maintenance of the authorizations.  The authorizations may be 
discontinued in a number of circumstances, but most notable is the 
ability for any party to the comprehensive agreement to give notice of 
the last sale of any product containing the gene trait at issue, which 
triggers the obligation to maintain authorizations for only four more 
years.194 
While the GEMAA is already effective, the DUCA will not become 
effective until there are three non-PRP holder signatories and three 
other signatories who fall into one of two categories: PRP holders or 
petitioners of the USDA for the deregulation of a trait.195  Because of 
the diversity and number of signatories that must be present for the 
DUCA to become effective, it may be a while before any of the 
 
189. Id. at 27–30. 
190. See generally id. at 27–30.  In addition to the costs associated with maintaining 
international regulations, there are operating costs associated with the DUCA that are paid 
by the signatories by assessment.  Id. at app. A at A11–A13. 
191. Id. at 31–32. 
192. Id. at 32.  The DUCA provides for an arbitration and mediation procedure to 
handle the development of the comprehensive agreement as well as other issues between 
signatories.  Id. at 50–52, app. C. 
193. See generally id. at 31–47. 
194. Id. at 47. 
195. Id. at 1; DUCA Is Open for Signature, supra note 29. 
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agreement’s measures come into effect.196 
Due to the fact that it is a voluntary contractual agreement, the 
success of the Accord rests on the number of signatories that it is able to 
attract.197  Even if the Accord does gain more signatories, the GEMAA 
provides for a fairly simple withdrawal process for signatories, merely 
requiring notice and a twelve-month period after such notice before the 
withdrawal becomes effective.198  Like the GEMAA, the DUCA 
provides a fairly easy mechanism for a signatory to withdraw from the 
DUCA.  The requirements for a signatory’s withdrawal from the 
DUCA only include one-year notice in writing to the administrator and 
the identification of any gene traits that the signatory has obligations 
under the DUCA for.199  While withdrawal is easy, it will not relieve the 
signatory from its obligations under any comprehensive agreement.200  
Without agreement throughout the industry to abide by the Accord, 
there is much left to the unknown.  In addition, because there are three 
possible choices for patent holders to make under the GEMAA in 
regards to maintaining international regulation authorizations and only 
agreement signatories may play a role in negotiations for such 
maintenance, there are many players in the industry, such as farmers, 
who may be left out of the discussion.201 
III. THE TRANSITION TO GENERIC, IN THE COURTS AND THE HATCH-
WAXMAN ACT 
Currently, there is no basis in national or international law to 
provide for a transition from a patent-protected, privately created and 
owned genetic trait to a generic marketplace.202  Without an express 
model to follow, companies wishing to develop generic seeds have been 
left vulnerable to infringement lawsuits.203  In response to such a lawsuit 
 
196. AM. SEED TRADE ASS’N, AGACCORD: DATA USE AND COMPENSATION 
AGREEMENT 8 (2013), available at http://cdnseed.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/BiotechAS 
TAAccord.pdf; see also DUCA, supra note 9, at 1; DUCA Is Open for Signature, supra note 
29. 
197. See Grushkin, supra note 6, at 10–11; GEMAA Is Open for Signature, supra note 
29. 
198. GEMAA, supra note 9, at 24–25. 
199. DUCA, supra note 9, at 62. 
200. Id. at 62–63. 
201. See GEMAA, supra note 9, at 1, 29; Grushkin, supra note 6, at 10–11. 
202. CARRATO & NEUSCHAFER, supra note 13, at 4. 
203. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., No. 
4:09CV00686(ERW), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84512, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 16, 2009). 
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initiated by Monsanto, DuPont claimed that Monsanto committed 
antitrust violations in its attempt to block competitors from developing 
generic seeds.204  A need to resort to antitrust claims could be avoided if 
the agricultural industry had a statutory framework for the transition to 
generic seeds similar to the pharmaceutical industry’s Hatch-Waxman 
Act.205  The Hatch-Waxman Act includes a safe harbor provision that 
allows competitors to begin developing generic forms of drugs prior to 
patent expiration.206 
A. Monsanto v. DuPont, the Anti-Trust Concerns 
For the past decade, Monsanto and DuPont have been involved in 
various legal battles.207  The most recent string of litigation began in 2009 
when Monsanto filed a lawsuit against DuPont, alleging patent 
infringement, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment.208  In response, 
DuPont made seven antitrust counterclaims.209  DuPont’s relevant 
antitrust claims were that Monsanto’s licensing agreements were based 
on a “switching strategy,” designed to force independent seed 
companies using the Roundup Ready trait with the soon expiring patent 
to switch to Roundup Ready 2 Yield, to extend patent protection and 
“prevent generic entry into the market before the patent for 
 
204. Id.; Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Stay 
Discovery and for Separate Trial of Antitrust Counterclaims, supra note 121, at 4–5. 
205. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code) (Hatch-
Waxman Act); Parloff, supra note 6, at 98. 
206. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 671 
(1990). 
207. Christopher Doering, Seed Giants Clash Following $1 Billion Judgment in Patent 
Case, GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, Aug. 2, 2012, at ARC.  Monsanto and DuPont control two-
thirds of the corn and soybean seed markets of North America.  Id. 
208. Monsanto Co., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84512, at *3.  The claim was based off of a 
2002 non-exclusive license agreement between Monsanto and DuPont, allowing DuPont to 
manufacture and sell corn and soybean seed with the Roundup Ready trait, a glyphosate-
tolerant trait.  Monsanto Co. v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., No. 4:09CV00686(ERW), 
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157410, at *9–10 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 2, 2012).  After DuPont created its 
own glyphosate-tolerant trait, known as Optimum GAT, or OGAT, in 2006, DuPont began 
stacking the Roundup Ready trait with OGAT.  Id. at *10–11.  Monsanto claimed that the 
stacking of its glyphosate-tolerant trait with DuPont’s was done to hide the fact that OGAT 
did not work and that the practice was in violation of their license agreement.  Id. at *9–11; 
Rich Keller, Monsanto and DuPont Continue Litigation, AG PROF. (Sept. 12, 2012), 
http://www.agprofessional.com/agprofessional-magazine/Monsanto-and-DuPont-continue-
litigation-169510356.html?view=all. 
209. Monsanto Co., 2009 U.S. LEXIS 84512, at *3. 
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[Monsanto’s] Roundup Ready[] trait seed line expires.”210  By requiring 
that independent seed companies switch from using Roundup Ready to 
Roundup Ready 2 Yield and destroy seed lines containing the Roundup 
Ready ’247E Patent before it expires in 2014, Monsanto would block 
these companies from creating a generic version of Roundup Ready, 
foreclosing generic competition before it begins.211  Ultimately, DuPont 
alleged that Monsanto sought “not only to unlawfully preserve its 
existing trait monopolies, but also to impede the entry of generics and to 
extend its monopoly power through exclusionary conduct into emerging 
markets for stacked traits and output traits.”212  In 2009, the claims of the 
lawsuit were bifurcated, with the patent infringement claims proceeding 
to a jury trial in favor of Monsanto in 2012, and the antitrust claims 
expected to go to trial in late 2013.213  However, in March 2013, DuPont 
 
210. Id. at *3–4.  The other antitrust claims that DuPont brought include claims that 
depend on the validity and construction of the patents for Roundup Ready as well as claims 
that Monsanto has anticompetitive restrictions in its licensing agreements with independent 
seed companies.  Id. at *3. 
211. Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Stay 
Discovery and for Separate Trial of Antitrust Counterclaims, supra note 121, at 4; Parloff, 
supra note 6, at 100, 104.   
By switching . . . to the Roundup Ready® 2 Yield trait, Monsanto seeks to remove 
the Roundup Ready® trait from the market prior to the time when 
competitors . . . will be able to market a generic product, thereby creating a bridge 
between its Roundup Ready® patent monopoly and its Roundup Ready® 2 Yield 
patent monopoly of longer duration. 
Defendants’ Amended Answer and Counterclaims at 23–24, Monsanto Co. v. E.I. du Pont de 
Nemours & Co., No. 4:09CV00686(ERW), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84512 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 16, 
2009). 
212. Defendants’ Amended Answer and Counterclaims, supra note 211, at 24. 
213. Monsanto Co., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84512, at *3, *7; Doering, supra note 207.  
The jury trial for patent infringement ended in the jury awarding a surprising one billion 
dollars in damages to Monsanto, the largest verdict in Missouri history and one of the largest 
verdicts of 2012 in the United States.  Gustin, supra note 74; see also Margaret Cronin Fisk, 
Largest U.S. Jury Verdicts of 2012 (Table), BLOOMBERG (Jan. 17, 2013, 10:00 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-18/largest-u-s-jury-verdicts-of-2012-table-.html 
(showing the one billion dollar judgment to be the third largest jury award of 2012); Margaret 
Cronin Fisk, U.S. Patent Jury Awards Soar with Some Big Ones Cut by Judges, BLOOMBERG 
(Jan. 18, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-18/patent-trial-awards-
soar-with-some-big-ones-cut-by-judges.html.  After a judge unsealed a sanction order, it was 
revealed that “DuPont executives and lawyers . . . knew the company didn’t have an 
agreement allowing it to combine Monsanto’s Roundup Ready soybeans with a second trait.”  
Jack Kaskey & Susan Decker, DuPont ‘Fraud’ in Monsanto Seed Case Unsealed by Judge, 
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 30, 2012, 12:04 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-11-30/dupont 
-fraud-in-monsanto-seed-case-unsealed-by-judge.html.  The antitrust case scheduled for late 
2013 would have been before a new jury but the same judge who presided over the patent 
infringement case.  Id. 
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and Monsanto announced that they had reached a settlement 
agreement, in which the billion-dollar verdict in favor of Monsanto for 
the patent infringement claims was thrown out and DuPont agreed to 
drop its antitrust lawsuit.214  In conjunction with this settlement 
agreement, Monsanto and DuPont entered into technology license 
agreements that granted DuPont “regulatory access and maintenance 
support for [the] Roundup Ready” trait in soybeans after the ’247E 
Patent expires.215 
As a result of DuPont’s antitrust claims against Monsanto, the 
Department of Justice began investigating possible antitrust practices in 
the seed industry.216  After holding a series of workshops217 and 
requesting information from seed companies, the formal investigation 
quietly ended after two years in November of 2012, with the agency 
stating that it would not take action against Monsanto.218  Following the 
decision, DuPont did not initially back away from its antitrust claims, 
stating that “[t]he investigation by [the Department of Justice] is 
separate from the antitrust claims DuPont has brought against 
 
214. E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company, Quarterly Report Pursuant to Section 13 
or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Form 10-Q) 25–26 (Oct. 22, 2013) 
(“[DuPont] agreed to dismiss with prejudice its antitrust claims against Monsanto in exchange 
for a dismissal with prejudice of Monsanto’s patent infringement claims and the related 
damages verdict.  Accordingly, as of the first quarter 2013 this matter was resolved, but for 
the court-ordered sanctions against the company for ‘fraud against the court.’  The court 
unsealed the order in November 2012.  The parties agreed to present the sanctions and 
related rulings for immediate appeal and those matters are presently on appeal.”); Andrew 
Pollack, Monsanto and DuPont Settle Fight Over Patent Licensing, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2013, 
at B8. 
215. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Company, supra note 214, at 25–26. 
216. Georgina Gustin, Justice Dept. Ends Monsanto Antitrust Inquiry, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Nov. 20, 2012, at A10.  Beginning in 2010, the Justice Department’s investigation 
was “the first time US regulators scrutinized competition in the highly consolidated seed 
market.”  Rebecca Coons, DOJ Drops Antitrust Inquiry into Seed Industry and Monsanto, 
CHEMICAL WK., Nov. 26/Dec. 3, 2012, at 7. 
217. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND AGRICULTURE: VOICES FROM THE 
WORKSHOPS ON AGRICULTURE AND ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT IN OUR 21ST CENTURY 
ECONOMY AND THOUGHTS ON THE WAY FORWARD 2–4 (2012), available at http://www.just 
ice.gov/atr/public/reports/283291.pdf. 
218. Gustin, supra note 216; Tom Philpott, DOJ Mysteriously Quits Monsanto Antitrust 
Investigation, MOTHER JONES (Dec. 1, 2012, 3:03 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/tom-
philpott/2012/11/dojs-monsantoseed-industry-investigation-ends-thud.  The quiet manner in 
which the Department of Justice ended its inquiry into Monsanto, without even a press 
release, left the public wondering why.  Philpott, supra. 
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Monsanto and is not an indication or a decision that Monsanto has not 
violated antitrust laws.”219 
As the investigation ended, the Department of Justice indicated that 
“many farmers say that the prices they’re paying are indeed out of hand 
for seed,” and “farmers say that their choice, their seed options, are 
dramatically reduced, especially in the way of conventional corn and 
soybean varieties.”220  In addition, the Department of Justice noted a 
fear among farmers “that the best and newest genetics will only be 
introduced with expensive patented traits stacked into them.”221  Over 
the years, there has been concern that farmers do not have access to low 
price seed options and that the price for seeds has grown faster than the 
prices farmers are paid for their crops.222  Interestingly, the DUCA 
included a set of guidelines for its signatories to follow in regards to 
antitrust practices.223 
While a formal regulation for the transition of genetic patents into a 
generic form will not necessarily help bring “the best and newest 
genetics” to farmers at reasonable prices, it would provide more low 
price seed options.224  Now that DuPont’s antitrust claims against 
Monsanto have been dropped, there is little hope that a legal solution 
regarding the transition into the public domain for patented seed traits 
will come into effect before the ’247E Patent expires in late 2014.225  
Monsanto has stated that it will not prevent competitors from creating 
generic versions of traits once they lose patent protection, but this 
promise does not guarantee that generic versions will ever reach the 
 
219. Gustin, supra note 216 (quoting DuPont spokesman, Daniel A. Turner).  DuPont 
faced an uphill battle in pursuing its antitrust claims against Monsanto after the Department 
of Justice dropped its investigation into the seed industry.  Kaskey & Decker, supra note 213 
(“The [Department of Justice] decision may not bode well for DuPont’s remaining antitrust 
claims against Monsanto.” (quoting Attorney Greg Neppl)). 
220. Coons, supra note 216 (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 217, at 13). 
221. Id.  
222. Philpott, supra note 218 (citing a study done between 2000 and 2008 by the 
American Antitrust Institute indicating that the seed industry is increasing its prices on seeds 
higher than the prices farmers receive for their crops, and a 2010 survey by a University of 
Illinois researcher, indicating that a large percentage of farmers in Illinois claim to not have 
access to seeds that are not genetically modified); see also supra notes 95–97 and 
accompanying text. 
223. See generally DUCA, supra note 9, at app. F. 
224. Coons, supra note 216. 
225. Parloff, supra note 6, at 94; Pollack, supra note 214; Keller, supra note 208. 
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market and does not prevent Monsanto from encouraging a switch to 
Roundup Ready 2 Yield.226 
B. The Hatch-Waxman Act 
In 1984, the Hatch-Waxman Act was enacted to protect “both the 
interests of drug manufacturers who produce new drugs and the 
interests of generic drug manufacturers and their consumers.”227  One of 
the Act’s goals was to allow for economical production of generic forms 
of drugs.228  To do this, the Act included a safe harbor provision,229 
providing that: 
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, 
or sell within the United States or import into the United States 
a patented invention . . . solely for uses reasonably related to the 
development and submission of information under a Federal law 
which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or 
veterinary biological products.230 
The premise behind this safe harbor provision “was to allow 
competitors to begin the regulatory approval process while the patent 
was still in force, followed by market entry immediately upon patent 
expiration.”231  However, there are limits to the safe harbor provision.  
Specifically, it does not allow a company to produce a pharmaceutical 
 
226. Kaskey, supra note 137. 
227. Abbott Labs. v. Young, 920 F.2d 984, 985 (D.C. Cir. 1990); see Drug Price 
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code) (Hatch-Waxman Act). 
228. Mead Johnson Pharm. Grp. v. Bowen, 838 F.2d 1332, 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1988).  Prior 
to the enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act, the term of a pharmaceutical patent was 
“distorted” to extend beyond the expiration of the patent due to the period of time it took for 
any generic drug to obtain FDA approval.  See KAYE SCHOLER LLP, supra note 114, § 8:1.8 
fig.8-1. 
229. Pamela Fuentes, Comment, Nipping the Bad in the Bud: Using Hatch-Waxman to 
Renew Monsanto’s Crop, 30 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 81, 93 (2011). 
230. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1). 
231. Proveris Scientific Corp. v. Innovasystems, Inc., 536 F.3d 1256, 1261, 1265–66 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008) (holding that a patented device is not subject to a FDCA approval process and thus 
not a “patented invention” under the terms of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1), and is therefore not 
afforded the protection of the safe harbor provision).  The provision thus “allows 
competitors, prior to the expiration of a patent, to engage in otherwise infringing activities 
necessary to obtain regulatory approval.”  Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 671 
(1990) (holding that the safe harbor provision may be extended to include medical devices, 
and not simply drugs). 
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for shipment to regulatory agencies abroad232 or to stockpile the product 
just before FDA approval in anticipation of marketing.233 
The scope of the safe harbor provision has been tested in regards to 
the patent infringement litigation between Monsanto and DuPont, with 
an order stating that the stacking of the Roundup Ready trait and 
DuPont’s OGAT trait was not permitted under the safe harbor 
provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act.234  Because the Hatch-Waxman 
Act does not appear to provide protection for seed companies 
developing generic seeds prior to patent expiration, these companies are 
not protected from infringement lawsuits during the patent term.235 
Protection from infringement claims for the purposes of developing 
generic seeds is not addressed in the Accord.236  By failing to include a 
provision providing for protection for generic development, the Accord 
falls short of its goal of promoting “continued innovation in the seed 
industry.”237  While the Accord has been developed and signed by 
industry leaders, it is not surprising that it appears to better protect the 
investments these companies have made in developing their products.238  
Balancing the promotion of innovation as well as protecting investments 
companies have made in developing their products is a function of the 
 
232. KAYE SCHOLER LLP, supra note 114, § 8:1.8[G][4][b] (citing NeoRx Corp. v. 
Immunomedics, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 202, 207 (D.N.J. 1994)). 
233. KAYE SCHOLER LLP, supra note 114, § 8:1.8[G][4][b] (citing Biogen, Inc. v. 
Schering AG, 954 F. Supp. 391, 397 (D. Mass. 1996)). 
234. Monsanto Co. v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., No. 4:09CV00686(ERW), 2012 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163982, at *10 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 16, 2012) (referring to a court order from 
June 29, 2012, the “Hatch-Waxman Order”). 
235. See id.; Monsanto Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., No. 4:09CV00686(ERW), 
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84512, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 16, 2009).  This vulnerability to 
infringement suits is similar to that felt by producers of generic drugs prior to the Hatch-
Waxman Act.  Fuentes, supra note 229, at 88–89. 
236. See GEMAA, supra note 9, at 1. 
237. AM. SEED TRADE ASS’N & BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUS. ORG., supra note 143, at 2 
(stating that the goals of the Accord are to “promote continued innovation in the seed 
industry, preserve strong protection for intellectual property rights and potentially provide 
for new business opportunities”). 
238. See generally CARRATO & NEUSCHAFER, supra note 13, at 3–4 (outlining the 
various provisions of the Accord); GEMAA, supra note 9 (stopping short of creating a 
regime that enables the development and maintenance of a generic market for seed traits that 
have expired patents and thus protecting the development investments the patent owners 
have made towards the patent for an extended period of time); GEMAA Is Now Effective, 
supra note 26. 
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Hatch-Waxman Act that would be well placed in the agricultural 
industry.239 
IV. USING THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT AND THE ACCORD TO 
REGULATE THE TRANSITION TO GENERIC SEEDS 
To promote innovation and protect the intellectual property rights 
of patent holders, various aspects of the Accord and the Hatch-Waxman 
Act should be adopted by the United States Legislature, providing a 
structure for seed companies to follow when transitioning from patent-
protected traits into their generic forms while also delegating the 
regulation of the transition to an administrative agency.240  Regulation 
based solely on the Accord, a private-sector contractual agreement, is 
not enough—the need for additional measures is evident.241  While 
several have noted the need to adopt a regulation for the agricultural 
industry based on the Hatch-Waxman Act as a whole, it is the safe 
harbor provision that is the key to effectively protect large seed 
companies, small independent seed companies, and farmers.242 
Amidst the concern over increasing seed prices,243 infringement 
lawsuits resulting from the development of generics before patent 
expiration,244 antitrust violation claims arising from the enforcement of 
 
239. Welters, supra note 12, at 421–23 (explaining that the Hatch-Waxman Act would be 
an instructive model for the entrance of generic seeds into the market because of the 
similarity between the pharmaceutical and agricultural industry). 
240. Such goals are in line with the stated goals for the Accord.  AM. SEED TRADE 
ASS’N & BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUS. ORG., supra note 143, at 2; see also supra note 237 and 
accompanying text.  Federal regulation of the agricultural-biotechnology industry should be 
permitted under the Commerce Clause and the Patent and Copyright Clause.  U.S. CONST. 
art I, § 8, cl. 3 (Commerce Clause); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (Patent and Copyright 
Clause). 
241. About the AgAccord, supra note 11. 
242. See Fuentes, supra note 229, at 82–83 (arguing that the agricultural-biotechnology 
industry would benefit from a regulation based on the Hatch-Waxman Act in a way that 
limits the protections of patent holders); Welters, supra note 12, at 421–23 (explaining that 
the Hatch-Waxman Act would be an instructive model for the entrance of generic seeds into 
the market because of the similarity between the pharmaceutical and agricultural industries); 
Parloff, supra note 6, at 98 (noting that there is no equivalent to the pharmaceutical industry’s 
Hatch-Waxman Act in the agricultural-biotech industry). 
243. Philpott, supra note 218 (citing a study done between 2000 and 2008 by the 
American Antitrust Institute indicating that the seed industry is increasing its prices on seeds 
higher than the prices farmers receive for their crops). 
244. Monsanto Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., No. 4:09CV00686(ERW), 2009 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84512, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 16, 2009) (claiming that DuPont violated their 
licensing agreement by stacking genes, Monsanto sued DuPont for patent infringement). 
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limiting licensing agreements,245 and the maintenance of international 
regulation authorization for seeds with expiring patents,246 the adoption 
of the agricultural biotechnology equivalent of the Hatch-Waxman Act’s 
safe harbor provision may provide the answer.247  While some may call 
for more regulation on the industry by removing the right of patent 
holders to restrict farmers from re-planting seeds through licensing 
agreements, such an encroachment on the rights of patent holders would 
not provide for an equitable solution to this problem.248  If the right of 
patent holders to restrict farmers from re-planting seeds is removed, the 
goal of promoting innovation would not be met, for it would lead to 
decreased seed sales and thus less funding for research.249  An 
agricultural-biotechnology safe harbor provision, based off of the 
Hatch-Waxman Act’s provision, should read: 
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, 
or sell within the United States, import into the United States, or 
export from the United States a patented invention solely for 
uses reasonably related to the development and submission of 
information under a Federal or International law which regulates 
the manufacture, use, or sale of genetically modified organisms.250 
By including an express provision protecting the export of seeds and 
crops, as well as a provision allowing for use of a patented invention to 
meet international laws, this law would incorporate the important 
international concerns that have arisen.251  Additionally, allowing 
“competitors, prior to the expiration of a patent, to engage in otherwise 
infringing activities necessary to obtain regulatory approval” permits 
companies to prepare for patent expiration by developing their own 
generic forms, including forms that use stacking technology, thereby 
promoting innovation.252  In turn, the law would not overly encroach 
 
245. Id. at *5–6 (holding that DuPont’s counterclaim against Monsanto for antitrust 
violations should be bifurcated from Monsanto’s patent infringement claims). 
246. Grushkin, supra note 6, at 10. 
247. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006). 
248. Fuentes, supra note 229, at 104 (proposing a statute that would allow farmers to re-
plant seeds containing patented traits on their property). 
249. See supra note 237 and accompanying text. 
250. See generally 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1). 
251. See Grushkin, supra note 6, at 10. 
252. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 671 (1990) (holding that the Hatch-
Waxman Act’s safe harbor provision may be extended to include medical devices, and not 
simply drugs). 
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upon the patent holder’s legal monopoly, for the generic forms of seeds 
could not be sold in the market until the patent had expired and patent 
holders would still be able to bring infringement suits for those using the 
seeds improperly.  In a way, such a statute would be a revival and an 
expansion of the Plant Variety Protection Act’s research exception.253  
However, instead of limiting the allowable research to those with “bona 
fide research” purposes, it would be broadened to include those with the 
purpose of creating a commercial product.254  By allowing for the 
development and manufacture of generic seeds prior to patent 
expiration, a competitive market for generic seeds may begin 
immediately following the expiration, minimizing the antitrust concerns 
as well as the concerns over rising seed prices.255  Some may argue that 
allowing the use of stacking technology prior to patent expiration will be 
difficult to regulate where the traits are being used properly to create 
generic forms, as opposed to improperly for sale prior to patent 
expiration.  This is something that would most likely have to be 
monitored by the patent holders themselves and expressly provided for 
in licensing agreements. 
To avoid a finding that a safe harbor provision modeled after the 
Hatch-Waxman Act would also include the limitation of the Act that 
prevents a company from producing a pharmaceutical for shipment to 
regulatory agencies abroad,256 the agricultural-biotechnology safe harbor 
provision should also include an explicit allowance of the shipment of 
GMOs for the purpose of obtaining foreign regulation authorizations.  
Such a provision would read: 
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, 
or sell any genetically modified organism in the United States or 
another country for the purpose of obtaining or maintaining 
regulatory authorization in the United States or another country 
for the sale or importation of the genetically modified organism. 
This provision would specifically allow for the protection of 
international seed trade and prevent any gap in authorizations.  While 
 
253. 7 U.S.C. § 2544 (2012). 
254. Id.   
255. See generally Philpott, supra note 218 (noting the antitrust concerns that have arisen 
due to the coming expiration of the Roundup Ready trait and citing a study done between 
2000 and 2008 by the American Antitrust Institute indicating that the seed industry is 
increasing its prices on seeds higher than the prices farmers receive for their crops). 
256. KAYE SCHOLER LLP, supra note 114, § 8:1.8[G][4][b] (citing NeoRx Corp. v. 
Immunomedics, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 202, 207 (D.N.J. 1994)). 
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this provision would be beneficial for those who can afford to 
independently obtain international regulation authorizations, it would 
fail to protect small companies or sole proprietorships in the same way 
that the DUCA fails to protect such entities for lack of funding.257  
Additionally, it does not provide access to the PRP that is necessary for 
obtaining the international regulation authorizations.258  Because of 
these shortfalls, there needs to be a mechanism for maintaining and 
obtaining these authorizations for everyone, as opposed to the 
comprehensive agreements of the DUCA that provide access to entities 
with sufficient funding.259 
In creating a competitive market for generic seeds, the next 
questions that must be addressed are who will bear the costs for 
maintaining international regulation authorizations for the gene traits 
and how will the PRP be managed.  These are areas where the 
agricultural industry, through the Accord, has proposed an equitable 
solution in its GEMAA shared responsibility option, in which interested 
parties may elect to share the costs of maintaining the authorizations by 
entering into a joint agreement.260  The DUCA also provides a useful 
model in allowing for all interested parties to make their interest in 
maintaining the international authorizations known to others.261  A 
provision addressing the financial implications in maintaining 
international regulation authorizations should read: 
Three years prior to the expiration of a patent for genetic traits 
of a genetically modified organism, the patent holder shall 
provide notification to all interested parties reasonably known to 
the patent holder of the impending expiration.  Such notification 
will include information regarding how long the patent holder 
intends to maintain international regulation authorizations, as 
well as an accounting of the costs associated with maintaining 
such authorizations over the ten years prior to the notification.  
The patent holder will also submit this notification to a 
committee developed to oversee the expiration process within 
the USDA.262 
 
257. See supra notes 189–90 and accompanying text. 
258. See supra notes 183–84 and accompanying text. 
259. See supra notes 192–93 and accompanying text. 
260. CARRATO & NEUSCHAFER, supra note 13, at 3; GEMAA, supra note 9, at 4–5. 
261. See supra notes 185–86 and accompanying text. 
262. The USDA was selected here because of its role in the regulation of GMOs within 
the United States.  See supra notes 174–75 and accompanying text. 
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All interested parties will have six months to notify the 
committee of their genuine intent to use the relevant genetic trait 
in its generic form following patent expiration.  If the committee 
receives at least one interest notification, the patent holder will 
be required to maintain international regulation authorizations 
up to the patent expiration date. 
All parties that do use the genetic trait in its generic form 
following patent expiration shall report such use to the 
committee on an annual basis.  The committee will bear the 
initial costs and responsibility of maintaining the authorizations 
and then allocate the costs on a market share ratio to those using 
the genetic traits.  If a party qualifies as a non-profit organization 
under the Internal Revenue Code or a small business entity 
under the Code of Federal Regulations, the party will be 
absolved of its portion of the costs.  Maintenance of international 
regulation authorizations will continue until there is no reported 
use of the genetic traits. 
Once the committee gains the responsibility of maintaining the 
international regulation authorizations, the expired patent 
holder will turn over all proprietary regulatory property to the 
committee.  The committee will maintain the confidentiality of 
the proprietary regulatory property if it is protected by law and 
will only release the proprietary regulatory property upon the 
consent of the proprietary regulatory property owner. 
Spreading the costs among parties that are most likely to be able to 
afford the expenditures mitigates the costs to small farmers and other 
entities.  The maintenance of international regulation authorizations 
costs between $1 million and $2 million per year for each trait, a cost 
beyond the means of small farmers.263  The proposal to require patent 
holders to maintain international authorizations through the end of a 
patent’s life due to other parties’ interests in the patent is clearly a 
debatable requirement.264  Instead of mandating the maintenance of the 
 
263. ROGER A. MCEOWEN, EXPIRATION OF BIOTECH CROP PATENTS—ISSUES FOR 
GROWERS 3–4 (2011), available at http://www.calt.iastate.edu/system/files/CALT%20Legal% 
20Brief%20-%20Expiration%20of%20Biotech%20Crop%20Patents%20-%20Issues%20for 
%20Growers.pdf. 
264. Such a requirement to purchase an authorization internationally would surely 
produce arguments similar to the uproar over the individual health insurance mandate.  See 
generally Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012); Sheryl Gay Stolberg, 
Obama’s Shift on Mandate May Be Health Law’s Undoing, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2011, at 
A22. 
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authorizations, the proposed framework could suggest that if the patent 
holder decides to discontinue the authorizations at any time, the 
committee will begin allocating the associated costs to all interested 
parties.  However, this proposal has a greater probability of being 
abused by patent owners, for if they can unilaterally decide to 
discontinue the authorizations and absolve themselves of the associated 
costs while still maintaining the benefits of patent monopoly, the patent 
owner will significantly increase its profits. 
The management of the PRP necessary for international regulation 
authorizations is a difficult issue because it may be protected 
information itself.265  In an effort to respect the property rights 
associated with the PRP, the committee should be under an obligation 
to keep the information confidential.  Ideally, the sharing of the PRP 
with the committee and the interested agricultural community may be 
seen as a trade-off for the PRP owner being able to share the financial 
burden associated with maintaining international regulation 
authorizations. 
Putting a formal administrative agency in charge of policing the 
authorization process removes the power from the hands of the large 
company patent holders, while at the same time removing the monetary 
burden on them in maintaining the authorizations independently.266  
 
265. See supra notes 179–80 and accompanying text. 
266. While some may argue that there are serious conflict of interest concerns for 
governmental agencies regulating the agricultural industry, with a number of the top USDA 
and FDA officials being former private-sector executives from companies like Monsanto, this 
problem is beyond the scope of this Comment.  FOOD, INC., supra note 1, at 1:16:10–1:17:57 
(noting several examples of people who have filled both high level private-sector positions as 
well as top regulatory positions); Jeremy Bloom, Should Monsanto Be Able to Patent Genes? 
Supreme Court May Take Up the Case, in Part, OCCUPY MONSANTO (Apr. 12, 2012) 
http://www.occupymonsanto360.org/Occupy,Monsanto,GMO,Genetic,Engineering,Modified,
Organism,Food,Sustainable,Local,Locavore,Organic,RoundUp/clarence-thomas/ (discussing 
fifteen people involved in the government with Monsanto ties).  A conflict of interest along 
this same line is currently present on the bench of the United States Supreme Court in Justice 
Clarence Thomas, a former lawyer for Monsanto, who has refused to recuse himself from 
cases involving and affecting Monsanto, such as Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 133 S. Ct. 1761, 
1764 (2013), where the question presented to the Supreme Court was “whether a farmer who 
buys patented seeds may reproduce them through planting and harvesting without the patent 
holder’s permission”; Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743 (2010); and 
J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 126, 145 (2001), where the 
Court, with Justice Thomas writing the majority opinion, held that utility patents may be 
issued to newly developed plant breeds.  See FOOD, INC., supra note 1 (noting that Justice 
Thomas wrote the majority opinion for J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 
534 U.S. 124 (2001)); Doug Snodgrass, Ex Monsanto Lawyer Clarence Thomas to Hear Major 
Monsanto Case, CELSIAS (Mar. 11, 2010), http://www.celsias.com/article/ex-monsanto-lawyer-
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Arguably, it may prove difficult to keep track of “all interested parties.”  
However, the licensing agreements that seed companies already have 
with other seed producers and farmers would be a good starting point.  
In addition, by standardizing the transition process, any interested party 
unknown to the patent holder would know where to express its intent to 
use the trait, regardless of it being known to the patent holder.  Through 
the enactment of a law that balances the interests of both the patent 
holder and the small farmers and companies, the future of the global 
food supply may be protected.267  
V. CONCLUSION 
The United States Legislature should adopt a regime based off of 
the safe harbor provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act and the Accord.  
This will provide for a smooth transition into the market for generic 
GMOs by providing for the development of generic forms without the 
threat of infringement lawsuits as well as the funding for maintaining 
international regulation authorizations, while also delegating the 
regulation of the generic transition to an administrative agency.268  Plant 
and seed varieties have had a long history of statutory protection, with 
the types of protection available to them gradually increasing 
throughout the past eighty years.269  Since the 1990s, gene-splicing 
technology has been used to create genetically modified organisms, 
which now make up the majority of the United States’ corn and soybean 
crops.270  Monsanto, the leading company behind this agricultural-
biotechnology industry, is set to have its first economically successful 
seed patent expire in September 2014.271  In anticipation of this 
unprecedented event, the industry created the Accord, a voluntary 
private-sector contractual agreement that aims to regulate both the 
transition into the generic market for seeds and the management of the 
 
clarence-thomas-hear-major-mons/ (noting that Justice Thomas, who worked as a lawyer for 
Monsanto between 1976 and 1979, was not recusing himself from Monsanto Co. v. Geertson 
Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743 (2010), where the Court held that the district court was incorrect 
in issuing an injunction preventing the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service from 
deregulating Roundup Ready Alfalfa for environmental concerns, id. at  2750, 2762–63). 
267. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
268. See supra Part IV (outlining the proposed law that would balance the interests of 
both the patent holders and the small farmers). 
269. See supra Part II.A (discussing the history of protections offered to plant and seed 
varieties). 
270. See Pollack, supra note 23; see also supra notes 71, 76 and accompanying text. 
271. See supra notes 106–10 and accompanying text. 
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data used for international regulation authorizations.272  Despite this 
industry effort to provide for a predictable system and company 
assertions that seed saving will be allowed after the Roundup Ready 
gene trait patent expires, farmers continue to be suspicious and nervous 
about testing the system and opening themselves up to infringement 
liability.273  The importance of creating a method for a transition to the 
generic market is highlighted by the fact that the agricultural-
biotechnology industry itself is attempting to regulate the transition 
through contracts.274  The pharmaceutical industry has a statutory regime 
for the transition of patented drugs into the generic market with the 
Hatch-Waxman Act, specifically with the safe harbor provision of the 
Act.275  In light of the antitrust concerns regarding the transition,276 the 
global impact of the transition (due in part to the control Monsanto has 
over the global food supply),277 and the international regulation 
authorizations that must be maintained to sell domestic crops 
overseas,278 the Federal Government should take control of the situation. 
BRIANNA M. SCHONENBERG* 
 
272. See supra Part II.C (outlining the provisions of the Accord). 
273. See INST. OF AG PROF’LS., PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2013 CROP PEST MANAGEMENT 
SHORTCOURSE & MINNESOTA CROP PRODUCTION RETAILERS ASSOCIATION TRADE 
SHOW 28–39 (2013), available at http://www.extension.umn.edu/agriculture/ag-professionals/c 
pm/2013/docs/UMN-Ext-CPM13-Orf.pdf; Grant Gerlock, Generic Seeds Could Have a 
Short Life Span, NETNEBRASKA.ORG (Feb. 19, 2013, 6:30 AM), http://www.netnebraska.org/
article/news/generic-seeds-could-have-short-life-span. 
274. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
275. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 
98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code) (Hatch-
Waxman Act); supra Part III.B (discussing the Hatch-Waxman Act). 
276. See supra Part III.A (regarding the antitrust litigation between Monsanto and 
DuPont). 
277. See supra note 10. 
278. See supra notes 127–33 and accompanying text (describing the importance of 
maintaining international regulation authorizations). 
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